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Food product recalls, the removal of risky food products from the marketplace, can 
impose significant burdens for consumers, producers, and regulators. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to offer an in-depth investigation of the trends and demand impacts of food 
product recalls. The first objective is to analyze trends and patterns of food product recall 
events from 2004 to 2013. The analysis considers multiple factors, including the types of 
foods being recalled, the reasons for initiating the recalls, the severity of the risks posed 
by the recalled products, and the geographic distribution. The second objective is develop 
a general Bayesian model to illustrate how consumers form perceptions of risk based on 
personal experiences and external signals, such as recall events. The model illustrates 
frequently observed behavior following the release of negative information: an immediate 
change in behavior, followed by a gradual return to previous, routine behavior. The third 
objective is to estimate the impact of leafy green recall events on the demand for 
packaged leafy green products by analyzing disaggregated household purchasing data. 
The results of this analysis suggests that iceberg and romaine recall events negatively 
impacted demand for the implicated leafy green in the weeks immediately following the 
recall. The fourth objective is to estimate the impact of STEC-contaminated ground beef 
 
 
recall events on the demand for ground beef products, differentiating between recalls 
prompted by consumer illness investigations and those prompted by laboratory testing. 
The results suggest that the impacts of recalls prompted by consumer illnesses outbreaks 
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Unsafe contaminated foods are responsible for millions of illnesses and lead to significant 
losses in life and productivity. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] 
estimate that foodborne disease is the cause of approximately 48 million illnesses, 
128,000 hospitalizations, and 3,000 deaths annually within the United States (Scallan et 
al. 2011a and 2011b). Put another way, each year, one in six Americans becomes ill from 
consuming contaminated food products. Only 20 percent of these illnesses can be 
attributed to a specific pathogen, and in fiscal terms, these 9.4 million illnesses impose an 
estimated annual cost of 15.5 billion dollars covering medical expenditures, lost 
productivity, and quality of life losses (Hoffman et al. 2015). Fiscal estimates accounting 
for all foodborne illnesses are upwards of 55.5 to 77.7 billion dollars (Scharff 2012, 
Scharff 2015). 
To evaluate trends in foodborne disease, the Foodborne Diseases Active 
Surveillance Network of the CDC, or FoodNet, has been tracking infections commonly 
transmitted through food since 1996 by monitoring 15 percent of the national population 
through FoodNet personnel located at state health departments. The most recent 
surveillance data from 2014 as compared to surveillance data from 2006 to 2008 show 
that the incidence of Campylobacter1 has increased by 11 percent and the incidence of 
Vibrio2 has increased by an alarming 54 percent. When compared to surveillance data 
from 2011 to 2013, the incidence of non-O157 Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli 
                                                     
1 Campylobacter is a spiral-shaped bacteria that can cause disease in humans and animals. Most cases of 
campylobacteriosis are associated with eating raw or undercooked poultry meat or from cross-
contamination of other foods by these items. 
2 Vibrio is a rod-shaped bacteria which can cause foodborne illness and is usually associated with eating 
undercooked seafood, usually raw oysters. 
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[STEC] has increased by 22 percent.3 In contrast, incidences of Salmonella and Listeria 
have largely remained unchanged, though have improved in the long run when compared 
to figures from the first few years of monitoring, 1996 to 1998. Taken all together, a 
recent analysis of FoodNet data by Powell (2016) determined that between 1996 and 
2013 there has been no overall reduction in illnesses due to foodborne bacterial 
pathogens.  
 The industry-wide provision of unsafe foods, resulting in these non-decreasing 
trends in foodborne illnesses, illustrates the inherent risks in the growing, harvesting, 
processing, packing, and distribution of food products. The central obstacle is one of 
imperfect information. Consumers do not know with certainty what risks are present in 
the foods they purchase and consume. Thus, consumers cannot differentiate products 
based on safety as they can with many other product attributes, such as taste and 
appearance. Despite preferences to avoid risky goods, consumers may unknowingly 
purchase unsafe products because of this inability to differentiate products based on 
safety attributes. Producers, in contrast, have more knowledge of product safety than 
consumers because producers know the safety measures employed to reduce the risk of 
contamination during production. However, producers also don’t have complete perfect 
information in that they also cannot state with certainty whether a product is 
contaminated or not, unless each product is reliably tested for contamination. This 
asymmetry and lack of information ultimately leads to market failure because if 
consumers cannot differentiate products based on health risks, producers lose incentive to 
employ safe production practices. Therefore, the challenge for food safety regulators is to 
                                                     
3 Comparisons of non-O157 STEC incidence to earlier time periods are not available. 
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implement policies so that markets characterized by imperfect information can function 
efficiently. These policies include statutory regulation and government oversight. 
 Both federal and state governments engage in preventive actions to protect 
consumers from unsafe foods, including inspection, sampling, recalls, and research. Food 
product recalls, the removal of risky food products from the marketplace, can have 
particularly significant impacts for both consumers and producers, and are the central 
focus of this dissertation. The following five chapters investigate both general trends and 
consumer responses to food product recalls. The first chapter analyzes trends and patterns 
in food product recall events over the course of a decade, 2004 to 2013. The second 
chapter reviews the extensive literature on the impact of food safety information on 
consumer demand. The third chapter develops a general model to illustrate how 
consumers form perceptions of risk based on personal experiences and external signals, 
and how perception of risk may in turn impact demand. The fourth chapter estimates the 
impact of leafy green recall events on the demand for packaged leafy green products from 
2008 to 2012. Lastly, the fifth chapter estimates the impact of STEC-contaminated 
ground beef recall events on the demand for ground beef products from 2008 to 2012, 
differentiating between recalls prompted by consumer illness investigations and those 




I. Trends in Food Product Recalls: 2004-2013 
In an effort to protect public health and prevent foodborne illness, the federal government 
takes measures to ensure that the nation’s food supply is safe, wholesome, and accurately 
labeled. These measures include overseeing the removal of risky food products from the 
market. While removal of risky and potentially contaminated goods from the market 
benefits the public at large, the direct and indirect costs to manufacturers and regulators 
can be substantial. According to a recent survey conducted by the Grocery Manufacturers 
Association [GMA], 29 percent of companies that had faced a recall within the past five 
years estimated that the direct cost of the recall was between 10 and 29 million dollars 
(GMA 2011). These direct costs include notification (to regulatory bodies, the 
downstream supply chain, and consumers), customer reimbursement, product retrieval, 
storage and destruction, business interruption, and loss of sales of the recalled product. 
The total cost can be more extensive when accounting for indirect costs, including the 
cost of any subsequent litigation and the impact on the manufacturer’s market value and 
brand reputation. Additionally, these costs can often spillover and impact other 
manufacturers within the same industry, particularly for products that are marketed 
collectively. When a product is marketed collectively and has little to no brand 
differentiation, consumers may react by avoiding the commodity as a whole and the 
reputation of the entire industry may be tarnished.  
 Food product recalls also pose a great concern for consumers. Many consumers 
deem recalls to be negative signals that convey information about the relative safety of a 
food product, and concerns of unsafe food products and foodborne disease have the 
strong potential to influence consumer purchases and demand. Additionally, the burden 
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of information falls on the consumer to remain informed of current product recalls and to 
monitor home inventories. A national survey of consumer awareness of food product 
recalls revealed that 84 percent of 1,100 respondents had heard of at least one of three 
recent recall events, but less than half (45 percent) knew that there is always at least one 
food product recall in effect at any given time. The majority of respondents (59 percent) 
also reported having searched for a recalled product at some point in their own home 
(Hallman, Cuite, and Hooker 2009).  
Over the past decade, the total number of food product recall events has increased 
considerably. Given the substantial direct and indirect costs of recalls on manufacturers, 
consumers, and regulators, there is a fundamental need to understand the origin and 
reasons behind the general increase in the total number of food product recalls. The 
primary objective of this chapter is to analyze trends, patterns, causes, and outliers in 
food product recalls over the course of a decade, 2004 to 2013. Specifically, trends are 
identified by the types of food products being recalled, the reasons for initiating recalls, 
the health risk severity posed by the recalled products, and the geographic distribution of 
recalled products. Identification of trends and patterns may provide targets for both 
manufacturer food safety practices and regulatory oversight, which may ultimately aid in 
reducing the total number of recalls. This could potentially lead to a reduction in 
excessive recall costs, improve the overall quality and safety of the food supply, and 
result in fewer foodborne illness outbreaks.  
The period chosen for analysis, 2004 to 2013, is a critical period with regards to food 
safety in the United States. During this time, there were several major highly-publicized 
foodborne illness outbreaks linked to contaminated products, notably spinach (2006), 
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peanut butter (2009), eggs (2010), and cantaloupe (2011). Additionally, two major pieces 
of food safety legislation were signed into law: the Food Allergen Labeling and 
Consumer Protection Act [FALCPA] of 2004, which requires all food labels to list major 
allergens, and the Food Safety Modernization Act [FSMA], which gives FDA the 
authority to impose mandatory recalls and, if necessary, shut down operations at food 
production facilities. 
Background 
Within the United States, the two primary federal authorities responsible for food safety 
are the Department of Agriculture’s [USDA] Food Safety and Inspection Service [FSIS] 
and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Food and Drug Administration 
[FDA]. The FSIS inspects and regulates meat, poultry, and processed egg products, and, 
as a result of the 2008 and 2014 Farm Bills, also inspects fish of the order Siluriformes 
(e.g., catfish)4 (USDA FSIS 2015). The FDA inspects and regulates all other food 
products, including sandwiches (made in central facilities for off-site consumption), 
certain products that contain a small amount of meat and poultry (by volume), and game 
and exotic meats.5 This division of responsibilities dates back to 1906 when Congress 
passed two separate acts that charged one branch of the USDA with inspecting meat (the 
Meat Inspection Act) and the predecessor of the FDA with ensuring the safety of all other 
foods (the Pure Food and Drugs Act). The former addressed the unsafe and unsanitary 
conditions in meat packing plants and the latter addressed the widespread marketing of 
intentionally adulterated foods (Johnson 2014). Over the past couple decades, the 
                                                     
4 FSIS inspection of catfish became effective March 1, 2016. 
5 The FDA also ensures the safety of drugs, dietary supplements, medical devices, animal feed, tobacco, 
and cosmetics, but for the purposes of this study, only food products are considered. 
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Government Accountability Office has published several reports highlighting the 
inefficiencies of this divided system and has recommended broad restructuring of the 
nation’s food safety oversight (see, for example, Dyckman 2004). 
Nonetheless, both FSIS and FDA currently coordinate and oversee the recalls of 
products that may cause increased health risks. Examples of possible health risks include 
pathogen contamination, foreign object contamination, undeclared allergens, and 
undeclared sulfites. Health risks are usually discovered one of several ways: the 
manufacturer or distributer, USDA or FDA, or a state agency discovers the presence of a 
health risk through testing or inspection; a consumer inquires or files a complaint against 
a specific product; or a consumer illness prompts an investigation and the source of 
illness is traced back to a specific product and manufacturer. As soon as the threat is 
discovered and the manufacturer decides (or is mandated) to recall the contaminated 
product, the FSIS or FDA determines the severity of the threat posed by the marketed 
product and assigns the recall one of three classifications: Class I, II, or III. Class I 
represents a health hazard situation in which there is reasonable probability that 
consuming the product will cause health problems or death; Class II represents a potential 
health hazard situation in which there is a remote probability of adverse health 
consequences from the consumption of the product; and Class III represents a situation in 
which consuming the product will not cause adverse health consequences. The same 
classification system is used by both the FDA and FSIS. 
Lastly, FSIS, FDA, and/or the manufacturer usually issues a press release to 
vendors and media outlets in the areas where the recalled product was distributed. 
Vendors of the recalled product are instructed to remove the product from the market so 
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that it is no longer available for purchase or consumption. Likewise, consumers are 
instructed to check any products they may have purchased before the recall 
announcement and determine whether products in their pantry or refrigerator match the 
description of the contaminated product. If the description is a match, consumers are 
strongly encouraged to discard the product or return the product for a refund. If a 
consumer has already consumed the product, the consumer is instructed to closely 
monitor his or her health and seek any necessary medical attention.  
Data 
The FSIS issues a press release for almost every recall event under their authority. 
Conversely, the FDA will seek media publicity when the situation warrants widespread 
public awareness, for example, the nationwide distribution of a Class I recalled product. 
While not all FDA recalls are publicized with press releases, all recalls monitored by the 
FDA are included in FDA Enforcement Reports once the recalls have been classified 
according to the level of hazard involved. Together, the FDA and FSIS press releases and 
the FDA Enforcement Reports, archived and available to the public online, provide a 
complete picture of food products recalled in the United States.6 The press releases 
include the date of the FDA or FSIS recall announcement, a description of the product(s) 
recalled, the reason for the recall and the health risk involved, and the distribution of the 
contaminated product. In addition, the press releases sometimes include information on 
how the health risk was discovered and whether the contaminated product was available 
                                                     
6 Though there is significant overlap, these data differ from Reportable Food Registry [RFR], which is an 
electronic portal for industry to report food products when there is reasonable probability that the product 
will cause serious adverse health consequences. The RFR is maintained by the FDA and applies to all 
FDA-regulated categories of food and feed. 
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for retail purchase or distributed to restaurants and institutional facilities (schools, 
prisons, nursing homes, etc.). FDA Enforcement Reports can be used to verify the 
information contained within the press release, and also include the severity classification 
and the quantity of the product recalled. Examples of an FDA press release and the 
corresponding entry in the FDA Enforcement Report are presented in figures 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
 




Figure 2. Example of an FDA Enforcement Report Entry. Emphasis added. 
Between 2004 and 2013, the FDA and FSIS oversaw 4,900 food product recall 
events, and FSIS recalls of meat, poultry, and processed egg products accounted for 13 
percent of all food product recall events (table 1). Generally, the incidence of both FDA 
and FSIS food recall events increased throughout the decade. Several possible factors 
may explain this trend, but conclusively stating a cause is difficult. One unlikely 
possibility is that food has generally been becoming less safe. While Hennessy, Roosen, 
and Jensen (2003) outlined systemic failures in the provision of safe food, it seems 
unlikely that any of the inherent deficiencies they identified would lead to an increase in 
the number of recalls within the past decade. Moreover, if this were the case and the food 
supply was in fact becoming less safe, we would also witness an increase in the number 
of reported foodborne illness outbreaks. However, Powell (2016) determined that from 
1996 to 2013, there was neither a reduction nor an increase in illnesses due to bacterial 
pathogens commonly transmitted by food in the United States. Another possibility is that 
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during this time, technology of pathogen and risk detection improved, thereby increasing 
the number of detected health risks in food products. Indeed, in recent years, there have 
been great improvements in rapid detection methods, which generally are more time-
efficient, sensitive, specific, and labor-saving when compared to older, conventional 
methods (see Law et al. 2014 for a detailed review of rapid detection technologies). 
Alternatively, inspection efforts of federal and state agencies may have increased during 
this time, independent of technology improvements. Notably, the decade witnessed a 
change in federal administration in 2009, which may have impacted FDA and FSIS 
enforcement activities. Nguyen et al. (2013) found that the number of regulatory letters 
(i.e., warning letters and notices of violation) from the FDA to pharmaceutical companies 
was highest during the Clinton administration, diminished during the Bush 
administration, and increased again during the Obama administration. 
Table 1. Total Number of Food Recall Events by Agency and Year 
 FDA FSIS 
2004 298 49 
2005 243 53 
2006 211 34 
2007 260 58 
2008 263 53 
2009 888 69 
2010 469 70 
2011 509 103 
2012 664 82 
2013 449 75 
Total: 4,254 646 
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Lastly, the passage of two major food policy laws likely had major impacts on the 
incidence of food product recalls. The first, the Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer 
Protection Act [FALCPA] of 2004, effective January 1, 2006, requires all food labels to 
list major allergens. Under FALCPA and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the 
FDA, through inspections, ensures that food manufacturers comply with practices to 
reduce or eliminate cross-contact with allergens that are not intentional ingredients and 
ensures that major food allergens are properly labeled. Thus, FALCPA likely led to an 
increase in the incidence of food product recalls due to undeclared allergens. The second 
major law, the Food Safety Modernization Act [FSMA] of 2011, is the most sweeping 
reform of food safety law in over 70 years. Under FSMA, the FDA, for the first time, has 
the authority to impose a mandatory recall and shut down operations at food production 
facilities.7 While FDA has only exercised this authority twice,8 this new enforcement 
authority has the potential to change producer incentives to voluntarily disclose and recall 
risky products before being mandated to do so, leading to an increase in the number of 
food product recall events.  
 Examining recall events by the types of foods being recalled, health risks 
involved, severity, and distribution, may provide greater insight into specific outliers, 
trends, patterns, and causes behind this general increase in the total number of recall 
events between 2004 and 2013. Identification of any patterns and trends may also provide 
targets to focus regulatory oversight efforts. 
  
                                                     
7 In contrast, FSIS does not have the authority to mandate recalls. 
8 As of August 2016, FDA has only mandated recalls twice: the 2013 recall of Salmonella-tainted pet treats 
and the 2014 recall of dietary supplements linked to a non-viral hepatitis outbreak. 
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Recalls by Food Categories  
Seven main food groups were defined to categorize food recall events: grains, vegetables, 
fruit, dairy, meat and seafood, nuts, and other. These categories were further 
disaggregated into 99 individual categories outlined in Appendix A. These finer 
categories distinguish between different primary ingredients and various methods of 
preparation and packaging; for example, there are five root vegetable categories: fresh, 
frozen, canned, prepared, and dried. These categories were based on food categorization 
systems common in the nutrition literature, but adjusted to better suit the needs of food 
safety analysis. For example, following Painter et al. (2013), vegetable categories 
distinguish between fungi, leafy, root, sprouts, and vine-stalk vegetables, and meat 
categories distinguish between beef, pork, poultry, game, fish, crustaceans, and mollusks.  
Table 2 lists the frequency of food product recall events by food type from 2004 
to 2013. The top five food products recalled were prepared foods and meals, nuts and nut 
products, baked goods, grain products, and candy. With the exception of some nut 
products, these are all highly processed foods. It may be possible to gain further insight 
into the general increase in the number of food recall events by plotting selected major 
food categories over time. In doing so, we may be able to identify if any particular foods 
groups are predominantly responsible for the general increase and clearly identify outlier 
events (see figure 3).9  
 
 
                                                     
9 In addition to the seven major food categories, three additional categories were also plotted (prepared 
meals, baked goods, and candy) given the high frequency of recalls in these categories. 
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Table 2. Total Number of Food Product Recall Events by Food Type, 2004-2013 
Food Description Frequency 
Prepared Foods/Meals (excl. Soup) 581 
Nuts, Seeds, & Nut Products 532 
Baked Goods (incl. Packaged) 439 
Grains (excl. Baked Goods) 412 
Candy 388 
Gravies, Sauces, Condiments, and Dressings 245 
Fish and Fish Products 229 
Beverages 219 
Dairy-Based Desserts 211 
Fruit and Fruit Products (excl. Juice) 210 
Bacon, Sausage, and Lunch Meats 185 
Beef and Beef Products 172 
Cheese and Cheese Products 154 
Spices and Seasonings 138 
Soups 114 
Root Vegetable Products 92 
Leafy Vegetable Products 76 
Poultry and Poultry Products 76 
Mixed and Other Vegetable Products 66 
Mollusks and Mollusk Products 65 
Milk, Cream, and Yogurt Products 64 
Vine-Stalk Vegetable Products 62 
Nutrition Bars 57 
Sprouts 47 
Fruit Juice Products 46 
Sweeteners/Jams/Jellies/Preserves 46 
Crustaceans and Crustacean Products 46 
Bean, Lentil, Peas, and Legume Products 39 
Fungi Products 38 
Uncategorized Products 36 
Fresh Herbs 31 
Tofu and Meat Substitutes 26 
Pork and Pork Products 26 
Eggs and Egg Mixtures 24 
Baby Formula/Food 21 
Fats and Oils 21 
Vegetable Juices 7 
Game, Lamb, and Other Meat Products 6 
 
Total: 5,211 
Note: The focus of this table is on food products rather than preparation; thus the 99 categories of 
Appendix A are aggregated into 38 categories. Additionally, the total number of food recall 
events by food type exceeds the total number of food recall events in Table 1 because 282 recall 




Figure 3. Food Product Recall Events by Food Type and Month, 2004-2013. 
The most recognizable event is the January 2009 recall of peanut butter linked to 
a Salmonella outbreak responsible for 714 known illnesses and nine deaths. After peanut 
butter produced by Peanut Corporation of America [PCA] was implicated by 
epidemiologic and laboratory evidence, all identifiable food products that used PCA 
peanut butter and peanut paste as an ingredient were also recalled.10 And because peanut 
butter and peanut paste are common ingredients in cookies, crackers, cereal, candy, ice 
cream, and other foods, over 400 separate recall events occurred as a consequence. As the 
                                                     
10 The PCA outbreak is also notable for its subsequent criminal convictions. In September 2015, the former 
owner of PCA was sentenced to 28 years in federal prison for knowingly shipping Salmonella-tainted 
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CDC (2009) stated, “this was an ingredient-driven outbreak, in which a contaminated 
ingredient affected many different products that [were] distributed through various 
channels and consumed in various settings.” 
 Another uptick in the number of monthly food product recall events is the 
March/April 2009 recall of pistachios contaminated with Salmonella. Setton Farms of 
Terra Bella, the second largest producer of pistachios, recalled over one million pounds 
of roasted pistachio products just months after the massive PCA peanut butter recall. 
However, unlike the peanut butter product recall, the pistachio recall was not prompted 
by a consumer illness investigation, but instead prompted by FDA and commercial 
customer testing. Again, the pistachios were mostly sold to food wholesalers and 
manufacturers, who then packaged them for resale or incorporated them as ingredients in 
other products, such as ice cream and trail mix. In all, over 100 separate recall events 
were associated with the initial pistachio recall.  
The final major outlier is the February 2010 recall of products containing 
hydrolyzed vegetable protein [HVP], a flavor enhancer. All products containing HVP (in 
powder and paste form) by a single manufacturer, Basic Food Flavors, were recalled 
because of possible Salmonella contamination. While this recall was again prompted by 
commercial customer testing rather than a consumer illness investigation, this is yet 
another example of an ingredient-driven recall. In total, over 80 recall events were 
associated with the initial recall of HVP; this included the recalls of spice blends, soups, 
sauces, gravies, dressing, etc. 
While plotting the total number of food product recalls over time allows for clear 
identification of outliers, it is difficult to visually determine whether general time trends 
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are present. However, we can compare averages from the first five years to the last five 
years and determine whether the differences are statistically significant. Table 3 presents 
the average number of annual recall events for selected food categories. Whereas the 
difference in means for 2004 to 2008 and 2009 to 2013 was not statistically significant for 
vegetable, fruit, nut, and candy products, the difference was statistically significant for 
animal products, baked goods, and prepared meals at the five percent level and for grain 
and other food products at the one percent level. Additionally, the difference in means for 
all food product recall events was statistically significant at the one percent level.  









Grain Products 41.2 24.4 58.0** 
Vegetable Products 44.6 31.8 57.4 
Fruit Products 25.6 20.2 31.0 
Dairy Products 42.5 23.0 62.0* 
Meat, Poultry, and 
Seafood Products 
77.3 57.0 97.6* 
Nut Products 53.2 19.2 87.2 
Baked Goods 43.9 23.8 64.0* 
Candy Products 38.8 22.6 55.0 
Prepared Meals 58.0 38.6 77.4* 
Other Food 
Products 
89.9 54.2 125.6** 
All Food Products 490.0 304.4 675.6** 
Note: Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate that the t-test of a difference in the means for 
2004 to 2008 and 2009 to 2013 is significant at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Figures 4 and 5 plot the total number of annual fresh produce recall events and 
meat and seafood recall events, respectively. These foods are of particular interest as they 
represent the greatest health risk in terms of food safety. Produce and meat-poultry 
commodities accounted for the majority of foodborne illnesses, hospitalizations, and 
deaths between 1998 and 2008 (Painter et al. 2013). While the total number of fresh 
produce recall events appears to increase throughout the decade, the numbers drastically 
decreased in 2013. Therefore, only the difference in leafy green recall events for the first 
five years as compared to the last five years was statistically significant at the five 
percent level. Meat, poultry, and seafood recalls also did not significantly increase 
between the first and second half of the decade. However, the difference in means was 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level for processed meat, fish, and crustacean 
products. 
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Figure 5. Meat, Poultry, and Seafood Recall Events by Year, 2004-2013. 
Recalls by Health Risk 
Recalls are initiated upon the discovery of a health risk. These health risks have been 
categorized into seven main groups: pathogen contamination, undeclared major allergens, 
undeclared substances, extraneous material, processing defects, mislabeling, and other. 
Pathogen contamination includes the discovery of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli 
[STEC] (a sometimes life-threatening bacterium that produces Shiga toxin, which may 
cause severe abdominal cramps, diarrhea, and vomiting), Salmonella (a bacterium that 
may cause diarrhea, fever, and abdominal cramps), Listeria monocytogenes (a bacterium 
that may cause fever and muscle aches, particularly in older adults, pregnant women, and 
immunocompromised individuals), and other pathogens (such as, Staphylococcus aureus, 
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major allergens: wheat, eggs, peanuts, milk, tree nuts (e.g., almonds, pecans, and 
walnuts), soybeans, fish, and crustacean shellfish. Undeclared substances refer to food 
additives, such as sulfites, colors, aspartame, monosodium glutamate, etc. Extraneous 
material recalls occur when plastic fragments, metal shavings, latex pieces, or other 
foreign materials are inadvertently discovered in food products. Examples of processing 
defects include packaging defects, temperature abuse, improper pasteurization, and 
uneviscerated seafood among other possible processing errors. Mislabeling often refers to 
a packaging error, for example root beer bottled and mistakenly labeled as a cola 
beverage. Lastly, the other category includes risks and reasons that did not adequately fit 
into the first six categories, such as potential animal drug contamination, elevated levels 
of histamine, and inadequate pH levels. Table 4 lists the frequency of food product recall 
events by health risk from 2004 to 2013. Undeclared allergens were the leading cause of 





Table 4. Total Number of Food Product Recall Events by Health Risk, 2004-2013 
Health Risk (Reason for Recall) Frequency 
Undeclared Allergens 1,343 
Salmonella 1, 308 
Other Reasons 544 
Listeria monocytogenes 502 
STEC (Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli) 149 
Undeclared Substances 480 
Extraneous Material 256 
Processing Defect 203 
Mislabeling 151 
Other Pathogens 60 
Note: Ninety-six recall events were initiated for more than one reason. Additionally, health risk 
information was missing for one observation. 
Table 5 lists the frequency of health risks for the top five recalled food products 
from table 2 between 2004 and 2013. For each of these foods with the exception of nut 
products, undeclared allergens was the number one reason products were recalled, 
accounting for 39 to 62 percent of product recalls. The next most frequent reason was 
concern for potential Salmonella contamination; though for prepared foods, potential 




Table 5. Health Risks for Selected Food Categories, 2004-2013 
Health Risk Frequency Health Risk Frequency 
Prepared Foods (excl. Soup) 581 Grains (excl. Baked Goods) 412 
Undeclared Allergens 242 (42%) Undeclared Allergens 201 (49%) 
Listeria monocytogenes 149 (26%) Salmonella 86 (21%) 
Salmonella 56 (10%) Extraneous Material 50 (12%) 
Extraneous Material 42 (7%) Undeclared Substances 37 (9%) 
Undeclared Substances 37 (6%) Other Reasons 32 (8%) 
Other Reasons 22 (4%) Mislabeling 12 (3%) 
Processing Defect 16 (3%) Other Pathogens 3 (1%) 
STEC 14 (2 %) Listeria monocytogenes 1 (0%) 
Mislabeling 14 (2%) Processing Defect 1 (0%) 
Other Pathogens 2 (0%)   
Nuts, Seeds, & Nut Products 532 Candy 388 
Salmonella 423 (80%) Undeclared Allergens 150 (39%) 
Undeclared Allergens 52 (10%) Salmonella 122 (31%) 
Undeclared Substances 35 (7%) Undeclared Substances 58 (15%) 
Other Reasons 10 (2%) Other Reasons 39 (10%) 
Extraneous Material 9 (2%) Extraneous Material 21 (5%) 
Mislabeling 6 (1%) Mislabeling 16 (4%) 
Listeria monocytogenes 4 (1%) STEC 1 (0%) 
Processing Defect 2 (0%) Listeria monocytogenes 1 (0 %) 
STEC 1 (0%) Processing Defect 1 (0%) 
Baked Goodsa 439   
Undeclared Allergens 274 (62%)   
Salmonella 80 (18%)   
Undeclared Substances 39 (9%)   
Extraneous Material 22 (5%)   
Other Reasons 16 (4%)   
Mislabeling 9 (2%) 
 
  
Other Pathogens 5 (1%)   
Listeria monocytogenes 3 (1%)   
STEC 1 (0%)   
a Health risk information is missing for one baked good observation. 
By plotting the health risks over time, it may be possible to gain further insight 
into whether a particular health risk is predominantly responsible for the general increase 
in food product recalls and again identify outlier events (see figure 6). Once more, the 
ingredient-driven recalls of peanut butter, pistachios, and HVP due to possible 
Salmonella contamination are again immediately recognizable. Additionally, in contrast 
23 
 
to Salmonella recalls that appear to be mostly attributable to outlier events, the number of 
undeclared allergen recalls appears to increase steadily throughout the decade. We can 
formally verify the existence of this trend and other trends by comparing averages from 
the first five years to the last five years and calculating statistically significant 
differences. These averages and calculations, presented in table 6, suggest that indeed the 
number of recalls attributable to undeclared allergens and mislabeling were significantly 
greater in the latter half of the decade than the former. And as suspected, the greatest 
difference in absolute terms was due to undeclared allergens. 
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STEC  14.9 13.6 16.2 
Salmonella 130.8 36.2 225.4 
Listeria monocytogenes 50.2 37.2 63.2 
Other Pathogens 6.0 4.4 7.6 
Undeclared Allergens 134.3 90.6 178.0
* 
Undeclared Substances 48.0 45.2 50.8 
Extraneous Material 25.6 17.4 33.8 
Processing Defect 20.3 10.4 19.8 
Mislabeling 15.1 15 25.6* 
Other Reasons 54.4 41.2 67.6 
Note: Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate that the t-test of a difference in the means for 
2004 to 2008 and 2009 to 2013 is significant at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
Figures 7 and 8 plot the annual health risks associated with fresh produce recall 
events and meat and seafood recall events, respectively. Bacterial pathogen 
contamination, specifically Salmonella, Listeria monocytogenes, and STEC, accounted 
for 92 percent of all produce recall events. In contrast, Salmonella, Listeria, and STEC 
contamination accounted for only 40 percent of meat, poultry, and seafood recall events. 
Additionally, the difference in meansbetween the first half of the decade and the second 
half was statisically siginacant at the five percent level for meat, poultry, and seafood 




Figure 7. Fresh Produce Recall Events by Health Risk and Year, 2004-2013. 
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Recalls by Health Risk Severity 
Once a health risk is identified and a manufacturer decides to recall a product, the 
FDA or FSIS determines the severity of the health risk posed by the recalled product to 
the general public and categorizes the recall into one of three severity classifications. 
Class I represents a health hazard situation in which there is reasonable probability that 
consuming the product will cause health problems or potentially death; Class II 
represents a potential health hazard situation in which there is a remote probability of 
adverse health problems from the consumption of the product; and Class III represents a 
situation in which consuming the product will not cause adverse health consequences. 
Table 7 lists the total number of food product recall events by class and year from 2004 
to 2013. For recalls with classification information, 61 percent of recalls were Class I 
recalls, 31 percent were Class II recalls, and 10 percent were Class III recalls. Note, 
however, that 493 recalls, 10 percent of all recall event observations, had missing 
classification information. All of these recalls (with the exception of one) were recalls 
overseen by the FDA. As previously noted, the source for FDA recall information was 
the FDA press releases and the FDA Enforcement Reports. While not all FDA recalls are 
publicized with press releases, all FDA recalls should be logged in FDA Enforcement 
Reports. The press releases contain a great deal of data, but the severity classification is 
noted only in the FDA Enforcement Reports. Of the 492 recalls overseen by the FDA 
with missing classification information, 97 percent (477 recalls) are recalls identified in 
press releases, but could not be matched to an entry in the FDA Enforcement Reports.11 
                                                     
11 The remaining three percent are 2006 and 2007 recalls that were matched to an Enforcement Report, but 
the information in the Enforcement Report was incomplete.  
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The number of recalls with missing classification information is greatest in 2009 and 
accounts for 43 percent of all missing observations. However, 2009 was an exceptional 
year with a staggering 888 recalls overseen by the FDA; therefore, one possible 
explanation for the missing Enforcement Report entries may have been limited and 
strained FDA resources.  
Table 7. Total Number of Food Product Recall Events by Class and Year, 2004-2013 
Class 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
I 202 175 116 170 183 603 336 318 367 236 2,706 
II 58 65 70 79 70 116 153 229 276 233 1,349 
III 33 30 35 38 38 33 35 57 63 57 419 
Missing 57 31 27 33 25 212 22 23 52 11 493 
Note: The total number of food recall events by severity classification exceeds the total number 
of food recall events in Table 1 because 64 recall event include products in at least two different 
severity classifications. 
Table 7 reveals that the number of Class II and Class III recall events increased 
steadily throughout the decade, and we can again compare averages from the first five 
years to the last five years to determine whether any differences are statistically 
significant. These averages, presented in table 8, indicate that indeed the number of Class 
I, II, and III recall events were significantly greater in the latter half of the decade than 
the former, particularly the number of Class II recalls.  
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I 270.6 169.2 372
* 
II 134.9 68.4 201.4** 
III 41.9 34.8 49.0* 
Missing 49.3 34.6 64.0 
Note: Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate that the t-test of a difference in the means for 
2004 to 2008 and 2009 to 2013 is significant at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
 To determine whether some foods are inherently riskier than others and thereby 
the subject of more Class I recalls as compared to Class II or III recalls, figure 9 charts 
the share of Class I, II, and III recalls for ten aggregate food categories. Between 2004 
and 2013, nut products, when recalled, were more likely to be classified as Class I recalls 
as compared to other food categories. This suggests that when nuts, nut mixes, nut 
butters, and other nut products are the subject of a recall, they present a greater health risk 
to the general public. Conversely, foods categorized as grains or “other food products” 
were more likely to be classified as Class II or Class III as compared to other food 




Figure 9. Share of Class I, II, and III Recall Events by Food Type, 2004-2013. 
Note: Based on 4,628 observations. 524 observations have a missing risk classification. 
Though aggregation of foods into ten major food categories allows one to visually 
compare general patterns between aggregate categories, trends also exist among the finer, 
disaggregated categories of Appendix A. For example, for recalled fresh produce with 
classification information, 80.0 percent of fungi, 83.9 percent of fresh herbs, 84.2 percent 
of vine-stalk vegetables, 87.5 percent of root vegetables, 91.8 percent of leafy vegetables, 
93.5 percent of fruit, and 100 percent of sprouts were classified as Class I recalls. These 
statistics suggest that fresh produce products, when recalled, present a serious health risk. 
In contrast, for recalled meat and seafood products with classification information, 14.5 
percent or mollusk products, 56.5 percent of crustacean products, 56.7 percent of fish 





































Class I Class II Class III
30 
 
sausage, lunch meats, etc.), 73.7 percent of poultry products, and 79.5 percent of beef 
products were classified as Class I recalls.  
Another informative exercise is a review health risks by class to gain insight into 
which health risks FSIS and FDA deem to be the most severe. Figure 10 plots the share 
of ten health risks for each severity class for food recall events between 2004 and 2013. 
Bacterial pathogen contamination (e.g., STEC, Salmonella, Listeria monocytogenes, etc.) 
was almost always deemed a severe threat to public health; comprising 58 percent of all 
Class I recalls, and only 8 percent of Class II recalls and 4 percent of Class III recalls. 
Undeclared allergens were also a frequent source of Class I and Class II recalls, 
comprising 30 percent of Class I recalls and 32 percent of Class II recalls. In contrast, 
recalls due to undeclared substances, such as sulfites and food coloring, and extraneous 
material recalls were deemed to be lesser threats to public health as they were most 
frequently categorized as Class II or III. Recalls due to mislabeling and “other reasons” 
were deemed the least severe in terms of public health. Together, these recalls comprised 
the majority of Class III recalls, recalls that present no risk of adverse health 




Figure 10. Health Risk Share of Class I, II, and III Recall Events, 2004-2013. 
Note: Based on 4,406 observations. 493 observations have a missing risk classification and one 
observation has missing health risk information. 
Recalls by Geographic Distribution 
Most recall events are regional in nature. Recalled products are only occasionally 
distributed nationwide. In fact, between 2004 and 2013, only 25.2 percent of recall events 
included products intended for nationwide distribution.12 The remaining recall events 
included products distributed to regions identified in the FDA or FSIS press releases or 
FDA Enforcement Reports. The size of the distribution area ranged from a single city or 
county to dozens of states, and the average regional recall impacted five states.13  
Figure 11 maps the distribution of recalled products in the contiguous United 
States between 2004 and 2013. New York, California, Texas, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and 
                                                     
12 Geographic distribution is missing for 88 (1.8 percent) recall events.  
13 As mentioned in the text, FDA Enforcement Reports were used to verify the information contained 
within FDA press releases. Sometimes, however, there was conflicting information regarding geographic 
distribution in the FDA Enforcement Reports and FDA press releases. Of the 4,254 FDA recalls, 377 (8.8 
percent) had conflicting geographic information. In these cases, the geographic information from the press 
releases was used. For FDA recalls without press releases, geographic information from the Enforcement 
Reports was used.  
Class I Class II Class III
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Florida received the greatest number of recalled products. This was expected given that 
these are also the six most populous states, and therefore, receive and consume the 
greatest volume of food in the United States. 
 
Figure 11. Geographic Distribution of Recalled Products, 2004-2013. 
Note: Based on 3,558 observations. 1,213 observations were nationwide, 41 observations had 
other geographic designations (e.g., Northeast, West Coast, etc.), and 88 observations had 
missing geographic information. 
Discussion 
 Food product recall events increased by an average of 45 events a year between 
the years 2004 and 2013. An increasingly complex food supply system, technology 
improvements in health risk detection, increased regulatory oversight and enforcement, 
and the passing of two major food policy laws (FALCPA and FSMA) all likely 
contributed to the significant rise in food product recalls. By breaking down and 
examining trends and patterns, we can further pinpoint driving factors and form educated 
hypotheses behind the overall increase in food product recalls. Thus, the primary 
objective of this study was to analyze recall events over time by the types of foods 
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recalled, the health risks involved, the severity of the health risks, and the geographic 
distribution of recalled products. Identification of any patterns and trends can provide 
guidance for manufacturer best practices and targets for regulatory oversight. Moreover, 
an analysis of this sort, that considers both FDA and FSIS recalls, has not previously 
been completed and fills an important void in the literature.   
 The results reveal that recall events increased across several major aggregate food 
categories, increased across all three severity classes (particularly Class II), and occurred 
more frequently in population-dense areas. Additionally, the results highlight several 
major recent trends. The first is the potential magnitude and impact of ingredient-driven 
recall events, the source of several extreme time trend outliers, including peanut butter, 
pistachios, and HVP. Recalls of upstream ingredients can expand exponentially and 
impact dozens, if not hundreds, of downstream users of the implicated ingredients. 
Between 2004 and 2013, 22 percent of all recalls were the result of an upstream 
ingredient being recalled first. The widespread impact of these expanded recall events 
suggests that high-risk ingredients that are shipped to multiple manufacturers through 
various marketing channels for consumption in various settings may require greater 
oversight to prevent disastrous ripple effects for downstream manufacturers.  
Another major insight from the analysis was the significant growth in the total 
number of prepared meal recall events and meat, poultry, and seafood product recall 
events. Interestingly, the safety of these goods falls under the authority of both FDA and 
FSIS. For animal products, FDA oversees the safety of seafood products and FSIS 
oversees the safety of meat and poultry products. For prepared meals, FDA oversees the 
safety of prepared meals without meat and poultry and FSIS oversees the safety of 
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prepared meals with meat and poultry. For example, a frozen pizza with mushrooms falls 
under the federal authority of FDA, while a frozen pizza with pepperoni falls under the 
federal authority of FSIS. The significant increase in the total number of prepared meal 
recall events and meat, poultry, and seafood product recall events may be an example and 
consequence of the inherent inefficiencies of this bifurcated system and may provide 
further rationale for a broad restructuring of the nation’s food safety oversight. 
 Lastly, the final major insight from the analysis is the overwhelming increase in 
the number of recalls due to undeclared allergens. Between 2004 and 2013, undeclared 
allergens were the leading cause of food product recall events, accounting for 27 percent 
of all recall events. Accurately labeling allergens is vital for public health, especially for 
the public health of children under the age of 18. Four out of every one hundred children 
in United States reports having a food allergy, and the prevalence of reported food 
allergies is only increasing. Effective in 2006, FALCPA requires that all eight major food 
allergens (wheat, eggs, peanuts, milk, tree nuts, soybeans, fish, and crustacean shellfish) 
be properly labeled on food products. Thus, FALCPA likely played a major role in the 
dramatic increase in the number of undeclared allergen recalls. Future work monitoring 
undeclared allergen recalls is needed to determine whether the total number of recalls 
continues to increase or whether the observed increase was part of an industry adjustment 
period as manufacturers adjusted to the requirements of FALCPA. In any case, in 
contrast to pathogen contamination, which did not cause a significant increase in the total 
number of recall events, undeclared allergens are largely a labeling issue because 
unlabeled food products only pose health risks to individuals with allergies. Given the 
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massive expense recalls present, this finding suggests that more time and effort should be 
spent reviewing labels to ensure they are accurately labeled prior to sale.  
 In all, food product recall events have significant impacts for both producers and 
consumers. For producers, recalls represent a massive expense that can potentially 
bankrupt manufacturers. For consumers, recalls signal unsafe foods, and concerns of 
foodborne disease can potentially influence consumer demand. Given the increasing 
number of recall events and the substantial direct and indirect costs of recalls on 
producers, consumers, and regulators, there is a fundamental need to identify and 
understand trends, such as the ripple effects of ingredient-driven recall events, the 
increase in animal product recalls, and the increase in undeclared allergen recalls. These 
insights can provide guidance for manufacturer and regulator efforts, and potentially lead 





II. Impact of Food Safety Information on Consumer Demand: Literature 
The market for food safety is characterized by imperfect information. Therefore, 
consumers must assess the safety of a product based on their personal experiences and 
external signals relaying information about relative health risks. How consumers respond 
to food safety information can have significant industry implications, and therefore, is of 
great interest to producers, commodity organizations, and policy makers. That is, changes 
in consumer behavior in response to food safety risks can provide insight into the value 
consumers place on food safety and provide justification for increased food safety 
measures. However, there is still considerable heterogeneity as to how to best study the 
impact of food safety information on consumer demand. 
Over the past several decades, an extensive and growing body of literature 
empirically estimating the impact of food safety information on the demand for food 
products has emerged.14 These studies can usually be classified into one or more of three 
groups: studies that use continuous-time food safety media indices, studies that analyze 
the impact of a single food safety event, and studies that use data aggregated across 
consumers and across time. While each of these methods has its advantages and 
disadvantages, the conclusions are general similar. Most studies have concluded that food 
safety information has a significant effect on consumer demand, though the effect is often 
marginal and short-term. 
                                                     
14 While this section focuses on food safety information, there is also a broader literature on the impact of 
general product safety information. Specifically concerned with the impact of non-food product recalls, 
Crafton, Hoffer, and Reilly (1981) investigated the impact of automobile recalls, Cawley and Rizzo (2008) 
examined the impact pharmaceutical recalls, and Freedman, Kearney, and Lederman (2012) estimated the 
impact of toy recalls.  
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Historically, analysis of food safety media indices – indices constructed based on 
the number of published articles pertaining to food safety and product contamination over 
a specified time frame – has been the most popular strategy in investigating the impact of 
food safety information. Smith, van Ravenswaay, and Thompson (1988) concluded that 
media publicity following the 1982 heptachlor contamination of fresh milk in Oahu, 
Hawaii had a significant negative effect on aggregate monthly milk purchases. Brown 
and Schrader (1990) found that information linking cholesterol and heart disease 
decreased per capita shell egg consumption by 16 to 25 percent by the first quarter of 
1987.15 Similarly, using the same index data as Brown and Schrader, Kinnucan et al. 
(1997) found that beef demand decreased with the dissemination of cholesterol-related 
health information, while poultry demand increased and pork and fish demand remained 
unaffected. Burton and Young (1996) observed that media publicity of bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy [BSE] in Great Britain had a significant effect on consumer 
meat expenditures, with the market share for beef declining by 4.5 percent by the end of 
1993. Dahlgran and Fairchild (2002) concluded that adverse publicity regarding 
Salmonella depressed the demand for poultry, though the magnitude of the effect was 
small, less than one percent, with consumers reverting back to previous consumption 
behavior in several weeks. Piggott and Marsh (2004), using multiple meat-specific media 
indices for beef, pork, and poultry, found that the average demand response was small, 
though statistically significant, in the short-run and there was no lasting effect in the 
long-run. Lastly, analyzing disaggregated household panel data collected by the National 
                                                     
15 However, rather than using a typical newspaper media index, the authors constructed a lagged index 




Purchase Diary Group, Coffey, Schroeder, and Marsh (2011) also studied the impact of 
food safety media indices. Similar to the methods of Piggott and Marsh, Coffey et al. 
created several meat-specific media indices to estimate the effect of media on 12 different 
conventional beef, pork, poultry, and fish products. Ultimately, they found the food 
safety media index elasticities to be small, and for the most part, not significant. The one 
exception was the elasticity of pork chops with respect to the pork food safety index.  
The use of media indices, however, limits analyses in that it does not necessarily 
capture the effect of actual food safety events on consumer demand. For one, the use of 
media indices often implicitly assumes that consumers nationwide are equally affected by 
the same media information, thereby effectively diminishing any impact of a localized 
food safety event on local consumers. Secondly, consumers may perceive media reports 
to be a source of biased information regarding food quality, whereas actual food safety 
events may be perceived as a source of unbiased information. Thus, depending on the 
direction of the bias, media indices could potentially understate or overstate any impact 
on consumer demand. Along these lines, media reports may be positive (e.g., reports on 
improvements in food safety technology) or negative (e.g. reports on a foodborne illness 
outbreak) and determining whether a media report is positive or negative may be difficult 
to automate. Therefore, construction of indices can often be extemporaneous and noisy. 
Lastly, as Marsh, Schroeder, and Mintert (2004) acknowledged, there are likely 
diminishing returns to multiple media reports on a single event; therefore, media indices 
could again underestimate any impact of food safety information on consumer demand. 
Alternatively, other studies have analyzed the impact of a single food safety event 
on consumer demand. Foster and Just (1989) measured the consumer welfare loss due to 
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nondisclosure of information following the 1982 heptachlor contaminated milk crisis in 
Hawaii using the same aggregate consumption data as Smith, van Ravenswaay, and 
Thompson. In doing so, they first demonstrated using a dummy variable approach that 
the crisis had a sizable and significant negative impact on milk consumption. Shimshack, 
Ward, and Beatty (2007) examined responses to a national FDA advisory urging at-risk 
consumers (i.e., households with young children, nursing mothers, and pregnant women) 
to limit store-bought fish consumption due to possible methyl-mercury exposure. 
Analyzing disaggregated household panel data and employing both parametric and non-
parametric methods, they found that some targeted consumers significantly reduced 
canned fish purchases as a result of the advisory. Schlenker and Villa-Boas (2009) 
estimated the consumer response following the first discovery of BSE in the United 
States in December 2003 and observed a significant and robust drop in beef purchases 
using product-level scanner panel data from one of the largest national grocery store 
chains. Lastly, Bakhtavoryan, Capps, and Salin (2014) empirically estimated the impact 
of a 2007 Peter Pan peanut butter recall and found a significant negative impact on the 
demand for the implicated brand and a positive spillover effect for the leading competitor 
brand. Nonetheless, studies such as these, which focus on a single unique food safety 
event, may not accurately represent the impact of recurrent food safety events, such as 
recalls, which occur continuously throughout the year.  
To address these shortcomings, Marsh, Schroeder, and Mintert (2004) analyzed 
the impact of meat product recalls on consumer demand. In doing so, the authors argued 
that consumers perceive recall events as an unbiased proxy for low quality. Furthermore, 
they conducted the same analysis with media indices instead of recalls to determine any 
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differences in strategy. Their results indicated that recall events indeed significantly 
impacted aggregate demand for meat products, while media reports did not. Similarly, 
Tonsor, Mintert, and Schroeder (2010) also examined the impact of recalls on aggregate 
quarterly demand for meat products. They concluded that a 10 percent increase in beef 
recalls reduced aggregate beef demand by 0.2 percent and increased poultry demand by 
0.2 percent in the long run. Most recently, Taylor, Klaiber, and Kuchler (2016) analyzed 
the impact of ground beef recalls on consumer demand with disaggregated household 
purchasing data and determined that ground beef recalls had no impact on household 
purchases of ground beef prior to the discover of BSE in the United States. However, 
following the 2003 BSE discovery event, the average impact of a ground beef recall was 
a 0.26 pound per person reduction in retail purchases. 
 It must be noted that the majority of the mentioned studies used data aggregated 
across consumers and across time. However, aggregation of data across households 
reduces the amount of information available from demand analysis by ignoring 
variability in purchasing behavior among households. For example, any income measure 
included in a demand analysis using linearly aggregated data implicitly assumes that 
income is evenly distributed across households. If this unrealistic assumption is not met, 
the aggregate demand function will not represent the individual household function and 
parameter estimates will likely be biased (Mittelhammer, Shi, and Wahl 1996). 
Additionally, aggregation of data across time, e.g., quarters or years, further reduces the 
informativeness of demand analysis by ignoring or diminishing any short-run impact that 
may occur in the weeks immediately following the recall.  
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 To improve upon and contribute to the existing literature, Chapters IV and V 
analyze disaggregated household panel data and multiple food safety events that vary 
both temporally and geographically. As outlined above, previous studies investigating the 
impact of food safety information on consumer demand have relied heavily upon 
analyses of media indices, singular events, or aggregate data. However, analyses of media 
indices and singular events do not necessarily capture the impact of actualized recurrent 
food safety events, and analyses of data that have been aggregated across households and 
across time often ignore household heterogeneity, localized impacts of regional events, 
and any immediate short-run effects. In contrast, the case studies presented in the final 
chapters analyze disaggregated household data to estimate the impact of multiple clearly 
delineated recall events that vary over time and space. First, however, to motivate the 
empirical analyses, the subsequent chapter develops a Bayesian theoretical framework to 




III. Recalls and Consumer Perception of Risk: A Theoretical Framework 
 
Food purchase decisions are largely determined by a consumer’s knowledge of product 
attributes. Sometimes, consumers have perfect information prior to purchase, such is the 
case for appearance attributes. For other attributes, commonly referred to as experience 
attributes, information is only obtained after purchase, for example, taste. And lastly, for 
other attributes, referred to as credence attributes, information cannot be determined or 
confirmed even after purchase, such as nutrition and health claims. In the ideal case of 
complete perfect information, markets function efficiently. Consumers purchase products 
they demand at the minimum average cost of production. Often, however, consumers 
have imperfect information and must make purchase decisions under uncertainty, which 
can lead to market failure. Such is the case with food safety, which can be characterized 
either as an experience or credence good. Food safety is an experience good if a 
consumed food causes an acute illness that can be traced back to a specific food source 
with certainty. More often than not, however, food safety is a credence good because 
delayed reactions hinder efforts to trace back and identify the specific source of any 
discomfort or illness. In some markets, to remedy the imbalance of information between 
producers and consumers, third-party providers can certify and disclose quality through 
certification programs (Dranove and Jin 2010). However, in many food markets, there are 
very few, if any, providers that disclose systematic food safety information through 
certification programs. Often, the only instance when consumers are informed of product 
safety is when a product’s quality falls below a certain threshold, for example, when a 
product is recalled (Freedman, Kearney, and Lederman 2012). Consumers, in turn, may 
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use this information to update their expectations about the quality of other products in the 
same market.  
To fully understand how consumers respond and react to food safety signals, such 
as product recalls, one must first consider how consumers form perceptions of risk. Do 
consumers respond to negative signals? How do negative signals impact risk perception? 
Does the content of the negative information matter? And how do consumers perceptions 
of risk impact purchasing decisions? Answers to these questions are useful for motivating 
empirical analyses assessing the impact of food safety information on consumer demand. 
The objective of the following framework is to model the process by which consumers 
translate new information into risk, and in turn, how perceptions of risk impact demand. 
 Risk Perception Development 
Consumers derive value from food safety because it signals a lower degree of health risk. 
Yet consumers often face imperfect information; that is, they are mostly uncertain 
regarding the safety of available food products. If a consumer had perfect information, 
the safety of the food product would be no different than other quality attributes, such as 
taste, appearance, source, etc. And the consumer would make a purchase decision based 
on his or her preferences, income, and price of the product. Without perfect information, 
however, consumers must assess a food product’s safety based on their personal 
experience and communications. Often, when purchases are supported by satisfactory 
experiences, a consumer will form routine shopping behaviors (Hoyer 1984). Established 
routine purchases will continue until the consumer receives a signal strong enough to 
revise prior risk perceptions and decision rules.  
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The learning process by which consumers process information and update their 
risk perceptions can be expressed with a Bayesian revision process (see Viscusi and 
O’Conner 1984; Viscusi 1989; Liu et al. 1998; Böcker and Hanf 2000). Following 
Viscusi (1989) and Liu et al. (1998), let 𝑟𝑡 denote perceived risk, i.e., the perceived 
probability that a given good is unsafe at time 𝑡, and let 𝑠𝑡 denote a negative information 
signal on the safety of that good, e.g., a recall. The updated perceived risk (posterior risk) 
can then be expressed as the weighted average of the prior perceived risk and the sample 
risk: 
 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝜔𝑡+1𝑟𝑡 + (1 − 𝜔𝑡+1)𝑓(𝑠𝑡+1), (1) 
where 𝑓(∙) is a function that converts the signal into a sample risk and 𝜔𝑡 is a weight for 
combining the prior perceived risk and the sample risk. For simplicity, assume no news is 
good news so that 𝑠𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑓(𝑠𝑡 = 0) = 0, and 𝑓(𝑠𝑡 > 0) > 0. That is, when no signal is 
observed, the consumer perceives the food product to be safe and the sample risk is 
zero.16 The advantage of this Bayesian framework is that it illustrates frequently observed 
behavior following the release of negative information: an immediate change in behavior, 
followed by a gradual return to previous, routine behavior. Through a dynamic 
adjustment process and without any further information shocks, perceived risk eventually 
returns to initial levels. 
How long the return to baseline behavior takes depends on the strength of the 
negative signal. Stronger signals will inevitably require a longer recovery period than 
weaker signals, for example, recalls prompted by a consumer illness investigation will 
                                                     
16 The assumption that consumers may perceive no news as good news is not unfounded. A study of 
consumer attitudes towards food safety showed that individuals often display ‘optimistic bias’ and hold an 
illusion of personal invulnerability with regard to food safety hazards (Redmond and Griffith 2004). 
45 
 
likely require more recovery time than recalls prompted by product testing. To 
demonstrate this, assume the weight 𝜔 is constant throughout time. Suppose the baseline 
perceived risk is 𝑟0 and there is a negative shock in period 1. Assuming no more shocks, 
the perceived risk at time 𝑇 is  
𝑟𝑇 = 𝜔
𝑇(𝑟0 + 𝜔
−1(1 − 𝜔)𝑓(𝑠1)). (2) 














Assuming 𝑓′(∙) > 0 (stronger signals translate to greater risk) and because 0 < 𝜔 < 1, 
then 𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝑠1⁄ > 0. Therefore, stronger negative signals require greater recovery times. 
 Now consider the possibility of multiple negative signals. Suppose a shock occurs 
every period between 1 and 𝜏, followed by periods where no shocks are observed 
between 𝜏 + 1 and 𝑇 (1 < 𝜏 < 𝑇). The posterior risk perception in time 𝑇 would then be 
𝑟𝑇 = 𝜔
𝑇(𝑟0 + ∑ 𝜔
−𝑡𝜏
𝑡=1 (1 − 𝜔)𝑓(𝑠𝑡)). (5) 







Now define 𝜏2 as a period of time greater than 𝜏1, and again shocks occur every period 
between 1 and 𝜏1 or 𝜏2. Because 𝜏2 > 𝜏1, then the length of time to recovery following 
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𝜏2shocks, 𝑇2, will be greater than the length of time to recovery following 𝜏1 shocks, 𝑇1 ; 











≤ 0  
− ln (𝑟0 + ∑ 𝜔
−𝑡𝜏2
𝑡=1 (1 − 𝜔)𝑓(𝑠𝑡)) + ln (𝑟0 + ∑ 𝜔
−𝑡𝜏1
𝑡=1 (1 − 𝜔)𝑓(𝑠𝑡)) ≥ 0  
ln (𝑟0 + ∑ 𝜔
−𝑡𝜏2
𝑡=1 (1 − 𝜔)𝑓(𝑠𝑡)) − ln (𝑟0 + ∑ 𝜔
−𝑡𝜏1
𝑡=1 (1 − 𝜔)𝑓(𝑠𝑡)) ≤ 0  
∑ 𝜔−𝑡
𝜏2
𝑡=1 (1 − 𝜔)𝑓(𝑠𝑡) − ∑ 𝜔
−𝑡𝜏1




(1 − 𝜔)𝑓(𝑠𝑡) ≤ 0  
This leads to a contradiction because each term in the summation expression is positive: 
0 < 𝜔 < 1 and 𝑓(𝑠𝑡 > 0) > 0. Therefore, 𝑇2 − 𝑇1 > 0, which proves that multiple 
signals only lengthen the time necessary for recovery. Alternatively, this can be 
demonstrated by redefining the length of period 𝑡 to be inclusive of multiple shocks. 
Multiple shocks in a single period can be interpreted as stronger signals than a single or 
fewer shocks in a period, and because we’ve already shown that stronger signals lead to 
greater recovery times, we can also conclude that, similarly, multiple shocks also lead to 
greater recovery times. 
Demand Impact 
Now consider a consumer who derives utility directly from the consumption of good, 𝑦, 
and the quality or safety of that good, 𝑞.17 Assume that the quality of the potentially risky 
                                                     
17 Several authors have modeled demand for food safety by including a health function in the theoretical 
framework, where health in turn is a function of quality and other factors (see van Ravenswaay and Hoehn 
1996; Antle 2001). Alternatively, others have modeled demand for food safety by incorporating quality 
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good, 𝑞, has a binary distribution. That is, the product is either contaminated with a 
harmful pathogen, 𝑞𝐶, or not, 𝑞𝑁𝐶. However, as previously stated, although quality enters 
a consumer’s utility function, the exact quality or safety of a particular good is not known 
to the consumer prior to purchase. The consumer only has formed a perception of risk 
(the probability that a good is unsafe), previously defined as 𝑟. At this stage, several 
additional standard assumptions are necessary regarding utility. Namely, utility increases 
with consumption; utility increases with quality; and lastly, consumers are risk-averse 
and the consumer’s utility function is concave with respect to 𝑦. Ultimately, the 
consumer’s expected utility, 𝐸[𝑈], can be expressed as 
𝐸[𝑈(𝑦, 𝑞)] = (1 − 𝑟)𝑢(𝑦, 𝑞𝑁𝐶) + 𝑟𝑢(𝑦, 𝑞𝐶) (7) 
where 𝑢(∙) is a sub-utility within the general form. To determine the comparative statistic 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑟
, the change in demand in response to a change in perceived risk, we use the implicit 








< 0 (8) 
Assuming that the marginal utility from a non-contaminated good is greater than the 
marginal utility of a contaminated good (numerator) and knowing that 𝑢𝑦𝑦(∙) < 0 
because utility is concave (denominator), then as perceived risk for a good increases, 
demand for the good decreases, 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑟
< 0. Note that the comparative statistic 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑟
 is derived 
here from a simple one-good utility maximization problem without an income constraint. 
                                                     
directly into the utility framework (see Piggott and Marsh 2004; Coffey et al. 2011). For simplicity, the 
latter method is applied here.  
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However, it is also possible to demonstrate a similar result from a two-good (one no-risk 
good and one risky good) utility maximization problem with an income constraint. 
Next, linking food safety signals, 𝑠, to demand is straightforward. Applying the 












< 0 and 
𝜕𝑟𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑡
> 0, then 
𝑑𝑦𝑡
𝑑𝑠𝑡
< 0. That is, as a consumer receives stronger 
negative signals thereby increasing perceived risk, the likelihood of purchasing 






< 0. (10) 

























Assuming that, all else equal, the change in demand in response to a marginal change in 






, then 𝜔 ≥  0. 
This leads to a clear contradiction because 𝜔 is already defined as 0 < 𝜔 < 1. Therefore, 
we can conclude that the impact of a negative information signal on demand diminishes 
over time. Similarly, given the direct link between information signals and demand, we 





The theoretical model developed in this chapter establishes the conceptual framework for 
interpreting empirical estimates of the impact of food safety information on consumer 
demand. If recall events are in fact negative information signals that consumers use to 
update their expectations about the safety of food products, we expect consumer demand 
for the implicated products to decline. We also expect the strength of signal to influence 
the magnitude of the impact. That is, stronger signals are expected to have greater 
impacts. Additionally, through a dynamic adjustment process, we expect demand to 
recover and eventually return to initial consumption levels. The time necessary for 
recovery is a function of signal strength and the weight consumers place on their own 
experiences versus new negative information. However, stronger signals are expected to 
require greater recovery periods. Empirically estimating the impact of food safety 
information on consumer demand is an informative exercise in order to determine 
whether these relationships actually hold in reality. Chapter IV analyzes the impact of 
negative signals on the likelihood of purchasing leafy greens and estimates the time to 
recovery. Chapter V considers signal strength and analyzes the impact of varying 
negative signals on the likelihood of purchasing packaged ground beef, and again, 




IV. Demand Impacts of Leafy Green Product Recalls 
In September of 2006, leafy green safety made nationwide headlines due to an 
unprecedentedly large, multi-state E. coli O157:H7 outbreak linked to contaminated 
bagged spinach. In all, the outbreak resulted in 204 known illnesses, 104 hospitalizations, 
and three deaths. While the 2006 spinach outbreak is a dramatic example of a food safety 
incident involving leafy greens, bacterial contamination cases continue to occur on a 
regular basis, albeit on a smaller scale. In fact, using data from outbreak-associated 
illnesses from 1998 to 2008, the CDC recently determined that more foodborne illnesses 
were attributed to leafy vegetables (22 percent) than to any other commodity, including 
meat, poultry, dairy, and eggs (Painter et al. 2013).  
 The increasing prevalence and prominence of incidents of foodborne illness 
linked to leafy greens has the strong potential to undermine consumer confidence in the 
national supply of leafy greens, especially packaged and bagged leafy green products. 
Since the spinach contamination event of 2006, several authors have investigated the 
impact of the outbreak on leafy green demand. Arnade, Calvin, and Kuchler (2009), 
using aggregate expenditure data for spinach, bagged salads, and other leafy greens, 
showed that the 2006 spinach recall led to a substantial decrease in purchases of bagged 
spinach and a marginal decrease in purchases of bulk spinach, with impacts persisting for 
over a year. Additionally, their results indicated that bulk lettuces served as shock 
substitutes as consumers purchased fewer spinach products and more bulk lettuces of all 
types in response to the recall. Similarly, Arnade, Kuchler, and Calvin (2011), using an 
error correction model to estimate the rate of adjustment from disequilibrium after the 
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shock to equilibrium, found that it took consumers 8.5 weeks to return to the equilibrium 
for bagged spinach demand. 
 Inevitably, concerns of bacterial contamination and foodborne disease can 
significantly influence demand for leafy green products. As demonstrated in Chapter III, 
recalls may serve as external signals relaying information to consumers about relative 
health risk. That is, following a leafy green recall event, perceived risk of bacterial 
contamination may be particularly heightened if consumers interpret recall events to be 
an unbiased proxy for low quality (as suggested by Marsh, Schroeder, and Mintert 2004). 
The primary objective of this research is to investigate the effect of food safety recalls on 
the demand for leafy green products. The proposed present study contributes to the leafy 
green demand literature, and the food safety literature overall, by analyzing disaggregated 
household-level data to estimate the effect of multiple leafy green recall events that vary 
over time and space. By using disaggregated household demographic and purchasing 
data, this study effectively takes advantage of the geographic and temporal variability of 
leafy green product recalls in order to accurately measure the impact of multiple food 
safety signals on the demand for leafy green products. That is, temporal variability allows 
for the analysis of multiple recall events over time, and geographic variability allows for 
the analysis of a regional recall on the impacted region as compared to the rest of the 
nation. 
Leafy Green Recall Data 
Information about leafy green recall events was gathered from both FDA press releases 
and FDA Enforcement Reports, discussed in greater detail in Chapter I. As this study is 
primarily concerned with household purchases of retail goods in response to recalls, only 
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publicized food recalls are considered (i.e., recalls with press releases), and Enforcement 
Reports are used to verify the information contained in the corresponding press 
releases.18  
The present study focuses on the years 2008 to 2012, and during those five years, 
there were over 2,500 food product recall events overseen by the FDA; 41 of which were 
leafy green (iceberg, romaine, and spinach) recall events due to microbial contamination. 
Of these 41 recall events, 32 were publicized with a press release. Details of these recall 
events are summarized in table 9. The most common microbial pathogens associated with 
these recalls were Listeria monocytogenes (44 percent) and Salmonella (38 percent); 
however, other pathogens include E. coli O157:H7 (16 percent) and E. coli O145 (3 
percent). 
Table 9. Summary Statistics of Leafy Green Recalls, 2008-2012 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Leafy Green Recall Events 0 3 6 11 12 32 
Nationwide Leafy Green Recall Events 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Leafy Green Recall Events Linked to a 
Consumer Illness 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Romaine Lettuce Recalls 0 1 3 5 9 18 
Iceberg Lettuce Recalls 0 0 0 2 1 3 
Spinach Recalls 0 2 3 7 3 15 
As previously emphasized, the greatest advantage of using multiple recall events 
to measure the impact of food safety information is the temporal and geographic 
variability. Of the 32 leafy green recall events between 2008 and 2012, only two events 
                                                     
18 As a sensitivity check, the impact of non-publicized recalls on the demand for leafy greens was estimated 
and found to be largely insignificant. These results are presented in Appendix B. 
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included leafy green products that were distributed nationwide. The remaining recall 
events included products that were distributed to regions identified by the firm and FDA 
in the press release, and the size of the affected regions ranged from a single city or 
county to several states. Specifically, the average regional recall impacted 11 states, 
while the most expansive regional recall impacted 26 states. 
Household Demographic and Purchasing Data 
The primary dataset used in this analysis is the IRI Consumer Network™ - a nationwide 
panel of households that provide a detailed account of their retail food purchases. The 
panel is selected to be geographically and demographically representative of the 
contiguous United States. Households participating in the panel download a mobile 
application or are provided with a handheld scanner to scan the Universal Product Code 
(UPC) on all their purchases and upload all information through the Internet. Because 
household participation and commitment to the panel varies, IRI determines whether to 
include a household in the static panel based on specific criteria. The static panel only 
includes households that reported purchases at least once every four weeks for 80 percent 
of the year (11 of 13 four-week periods) and reported average weekly expenditures of 25 
dollars for one member households, 35 dollars for two member households, and 45 
dollars for three or more member households. The present analysis only considers 
households in the static panel, and between 2008 and 2012, 106,718 static households 
participated. 
 The data of household leafy green purchases include a detailed product description, 
product brand, leafy green type, date of purchase, total quantity, and total expenditure for 
every item purchased. Households also provide demographic data including county of 
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residence, household composition, household size, income, education, age, and race. In 
preparing the static datasets for 2008 through 2012, IRI included only the most recent 
values for household demographics because its practice is to overwrite household 
variables as more recent data become available. Consequently, the demographics file 
contains a snapshot of household characteristics from 2012 or the last year each 
household reported demographic data, meaning these variables are time-invariant. More 
information on the technical properties of the IRI data are presented by Muth et al. 
(2016). 
 To facilitate the analysis, several specifications were made. First, the products 
chosen for analysis were packaged leafy green products, specifically romaine lettuce, 
iceberg lettuce, and spinach.19 Static households participating in the IRI Consumer 
Network only record purchases of uniform-weight products and do not record purchases 
of bulk, random-weight products. However, in November of 2011, a subset of households 
began recording total expenditures on random-weight products, including random-weight 
lettuce and spinach.20 Though it is not possible to consider the impact of leafy green 
recalls on random-weight purchases from 2008 to 2012, it is possible to compare trends 
in household expenditures on random-weight and uniform-weight leafy green purchases 
for 2012 and 2013. For that subset of households, figure 12 plots total monthly 
                                                     
19 In greater detail, the products chosen for analysis are packaged iceberg and iceberg-based products 
(iceberg with shredded cabbage and/or carrot), romaine and romaine-based products (romaine with 
shredded cabbage and/or carrot), spinach and spinach-based products (spinach with shredded cabbage 
and/or carrot). Leafy green products containing dressing, toppings (croutons, nuts, berries, etc.), and other 
vegetables were not considered for analysis. 
20 Participating households chose from a list of products in their mobile application or scanned a bar code 
on a reference card to record product type and entered total expenditures. Households did not record 
quantities, which limits the usefulness of the data in food economics research. For more information, see 
Muth et al. (2016). 
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expenditures on random-weight and uniform-weight leafy greens for 2012 and 2013. 
Uniform-weight lettuce accounted for over 70 percent of the lettuce market and, for those 
two years, uniform-weight and random-weight lettuce expenditures appear to be strongly 
correlated. Additionally, uniform-weight spinach accounted for a very large share, 85 
percent, of the spinach market. Therefore, despite exclusively focusing our analysis on 
uniform-weight leafy green purchases, we were still able to capture the majority of the 
impact of leafy green recall events. 
 
Figure 12. Total Monthly Expenditures on Random Weight and Uniform Weight  
Leafy Green Products, 2012-2013.  
Data: Random Weight Static Households, IRI Consumer Network.21 
 Second, a monthly periodicity was chosen based on frequency of purchase. Of 
households that purchased leafy green products within a surveyed year, the average 
                                                     
21 In 2012, 33,854 households participated in the random-weight consumer panel. In 2013, 36,529 
households participated. Also, uniform-weight lettuce includes only romaine and iceberg lettuce varieties, 


















































number of leafy green products purchased was 10. Moreover, of households that 
purchased a leafy green product within a surveyed month, 53 percent purchased only one 
leafy green product within that month. This percentage increases when we disaggregate 
by type of leafy green: romaine (74 percent), iceberg (69 percent), and spinach (78 
percent).22 Given that the majority of households that purchased a leafy green within a 
given month only purchased leafy greens once, a monthly periodicity is justifiable. 
Additionally, if a household recorded no purchases in a given month, leafy green or 
otherwise, the month was omitted from analysis.  
 Third, only households that purchased a packaged leafy green product at least 
once during the surveyed period were considered. By only analyzing the consumption 
patterns of these households, we focus our attention on households that were the most 
likely to be impacted by leafy green recall events. Thus, the final dataset was reduced 
from 106,718 static households to 94,763 households. Summary statistics of selected 
characteristics of participating households as compared to the full IRI panel and Census 
figures are presented in table 10. The households selected for analysis had an average 
number of persons per household of 2.50,23 slightly lower than 2.61, the national average 
household size estimated by the Census Bureau. Households also had a median annual 
income range of 50,000 to 59,999 dollars, consistent with the Census Bureau statistic of 
                                                     
22 A biweekly periodicity was also considered and implemented, increasing the number of time periods 
from 60 to 130; however, the results did not significantly differ from the results of a monthly periodicity.   
23 Mean household size may be biased downwards because the number of reported individuals per 
household is capped at eight. However, households of eight or more members only account for 0.41 percent 
of households in the final panel. 
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median household income, $53,046.24 And lastly, 24.5 percent of selected households 
included an individual under the age of 18. 
Table 10. Selected Demographic Distributions from the IRI Consumer Network (%) 
 
Censusa Full IRI Static Panel Final Panel Dataset 
Household Size    
 1 27.5 23.0 21.6 
 2 33.5 41.2 42.0 




 5 5.4 5.5 
 6 2.1 2.1 
 7 0.7 0.7 
 8+ 0.4 0.4 
Household Income    
$0-$14,999 12.6 6.9 6.3 
$15,000-$24,999 10.7 9.7 9.1 
$25,000-$34,999 10.4 12.6 12.2 




$60,000-$69,999 8.1 8.3 
$70,000-$99,999 19.7 20.3 
$100,000+ 22.2 15.2 15.9 
Presence of Children    
Children under 18 32.8 24.2 24.5 
No children under 18 67.2 75.8 75.5 
No. of Households 115,226,802 106,718 94,763 
a Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
Fourth, and lastly, the analysis could not depend on observed prices alone. That 
is, if a household chose not to purchase a product, the price they faced for that product 
was not recorded. Therefore, the average regional price from store-sales data was 
calculated for each of the 73 IRI-defined markets: 65 major markets (e.g., Los Angeles, 
                                                     
24 Household income is reported by IRI as a categorical variable, not a continuous variable. 
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CA; Chicago, IL; Boston, MA; etc.) and 8 larger market areas (e.g., Northeast, Plains, 
etc.).25 When available, IRI assigns prices to each UPC-level transaction using its weekly 
point-of-sale data for the store chain or outlet type and market area. These data were used 
to calculate price per ounce of leafy greens (romaine, iceberg, and spinach) by dividing 
total expenditure (dollars) by total quantity (ounces). These average retail regional prices 
were then used in our model specifications. Table 11 summarizes and compares average 
retail regional prices with observed prices. 
Table 11. Summary Statistics of Observed and Average Regional Prices for Leafy 
Greens 
 
No. of Observations Mean Price ($/oz.) Standard Deviation 
Romaine Lettuce    
Observed 393,738 0.202 0.084 
Regional Average 3,304,989 a 0.219 0.022 
Iceberg Lettuce    
Observed 458,203 0.134 0.068 
Regional Average 3,305,078 0.145 0.022 
Spinach    
Observed 255,806 0.327 0.168 
Regional Average 3,304,154 a 0.351 0.042 
a The total number of household month observations is 3,305,078. The average regional retail 
prices for romaine and spinach are not complete because the price for romaine was not available 
for the Boise, ID market in December 2008 and prices for spinach were not available for the 
Spokane, WA market in October 2008; Boise, ID market in July and August 2008; and the Tulsa, 
OK market in February, April, June, and August 2008. As no leafy green products were recalled 
in 2008, these missing price observations should not significantly impact results. 
                                                     
25 Each household and transaction is assigned to only one IRI-defined market; therefore, a household in 




Together, the disaggregated household IRI panel data and FDA leafy green recall data 
allowed for a unique panel estimation of the impact of food safety information on 
household leafy green demand. The exact empirical strategy was twofold: an estimation 
of both within household variation over time and between household variation of 
impacted and non-impacted regions. Explicitly, the identification strategy measured the 
difference in household purchasing behavior before, during, and after a recall event, and 
measured the difference in purchasing behavior between households residing in areas 
impacted by a recall advisory and households residing in the rest of the nation. 
Motivation and predictions for the empirical analysis are outlined by the theoretical 
framework of a utility maximizing consumer facing risk uncertainty in Chapter III. 
Given the food safety context, demand was estimated using a binary response 
model. An analysis of food safety events warrants this choice because a household that 
deems a food product to be risky will be less likely to purchase that product, not decide to 
purchase but purchase a lesser quantity. In other words, the analysis focuses on the 
qualitative decision of whether or not to purchase leafy greens rather than the quantitative 
decision of how much to purchase (given that the household has already decided to buy). 
The general formulation of a binary response model can be expressed as 
𝑌ℎ,𝑡
∗ = 𝑿ℎ,𝑡𝜷 + 𝑐ℎ + 𝜀ℎ,𝑡 
𝑌ℎ,𝑡 = { 
1           if 𝑌ℎ,𝑡
∗ > 0






∗  is the latent variable, 𝑌ℎ,𝑡 is the observed counterpart (either a value of 1 or 0), 
𝑿ℎ,𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝜷 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝑐ℎ is 
an unobserved household effect, and 𝜀ℎ,𝑡 is the residual error term.   
 Multiple methods to estimate binary response models for panel data have been tried 
and tested. The simplest method is to estimate a linear probability [LP] model with robust 
clustered standard errors, where 
Pr(𝑌ℎ,𝑡 = 1|𝑿ℎ,𝑡, 𝑐ℎ) = 𝐸(𝑌ℎ,𝑡|𝑿ℎ,𝑡, 𝑐ℎ; 𝜷) = 𝑿ℎ,𝑡𝜷 + 𝑐ℎ.
26 (12) 
However, disadvantages of the LP model include that the predicted values of the 
dependent variable, ?̂?ℎ,𝑡, may be outside the range of 0 to 1, and it imposes a linear 
relationship between the dependent variables and the independent explanatory variables. 
Perhaps the greatest advantage, though, is that the LP model is easy to estimate and easy 
to interpret. The marginal effects are simply the estimated coefficients, 𝜷.  
 Alternative nonlinear models that address the disadvantages of LP model are the 
traditional random effects [RE] probit model and the conditional fixed effects [FE] logit 
model.27 The RE probit model, where 
Pr(𝑌ℎ,𝑡 = 1|𝑿ℎ,𝑡, 𝑐ℎ) = Φ(𝑿ℎ,𝑡𝜷 + 𝑐ℎ), (13) 
assumes 𝑿ℎ,𝑡 and 𝑐ℎ are independent, 𝑿ℎ,𝑡 are strictly exogenous, 𝑐ℎ has a normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance 𝜎𝑐
2, and 𝑌ℎ,1, … , 𝑌ℎ,𝑇 are independent conditional 
on (𝑿ℎ,𝑡, 𝑐ℎ). The advantage of an RE probit model over a simple pooled probit model 
(where the unobservable household effect, 𝑐ℎ, is ignored) is that the RE model allows for 
                                                     
26 Equation (12) includes household fixed effects, but we also estimated the LP model with time-invariant 
demographic variables instead of household fixed effects. 
27 Though one might also consider estimating a fixed effects probit model so as not to make any unrealistic 
assumptions regarding unobservable household effects, traditional nonlinear fixed-effects maximum 
likelihood estimation yields inconsistent results due to the incidental parameters problem. 
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serial correlation in the unobserved factors determining 𝑌ℎ,𝑡, i.e., 𝑐ℎand 𝜀ℎ,𝑡. Another 
advantage of the RE model is that it is subsequently possible to calculate average partial 
effects. 
 The FE logit model, where  
Pr(𝑌ℎ,𝑡 = 1|𝑿ℎ,𝑡, 𝑐ℎ) = Λ(𝑿ℎ,𝑡𝜷 + 𝑐ℎ), (14) 
relaxes a few of the assumptions necessary for the RE probit model. Specifically, it 
makes no assumptions about the distribution and relation of 𝑐ℎ to 𝑿ℎ,𝑡. In other words, it 
is possible to obtain consistent estimates of 𝜷 regardless of how 𝑐ℎ and 𝑿ℎ,𝑡 are 
correlated, an important advantage over the RE probit model, which assumes 𝑿ℎ,𝑡 and 𝑐ℎ 
are independent. This is possible because the logit functional form enables us to eliminate 
𝑐ℎ from the estimating equation (see Wooldridge 2002, p. 490-492 for greater detail). 
However, because we eliminate and do no obtain estimates of 𝑐ℎ alongside 𝜷, we cannot 
estimate average partial effects, a clear disadvantage, though we are able to estimate odds 
ratios. Another disadvantage is that in addition to 𝑐ℎ being eliminated from the model, 
any other time-invariant variables are also eliminated. And lastly, households for which 
the binary dependent variable is equal to 0 for every time period or equal to 1 for every 
for every time period are also dropped from consideration because they do not contribute 
to the conditional density of the log likelihood function (Chamberlain 1984).  
 Specific to the central analysis, household demand for leafy greens was estimated 
with the LP model with demographic variables and the RE probit model as follows: 





+ 𝜽′𝐂𝐇𝐈𝐋𝐃ℎ + 𝜿
′𝐌𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐇𝑡 + 𝝀




Additionally, demand was estimated using the LP model with household fixed effects and 
the FE logit model with the following specification: 





+ 𝑐ℎ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑏,ℎ,𝑡. (16) 
All four models were estimated four times. First, the models estimated the impact of all 
leafy green recall events on any leafy green purchase. Second, the models were estimated 
three more times to separately determine how purchases of romaine lettuce, iceberg 
lettuce, and spinach were impacted by romaine, iceberg and spinach recall events. In both 
equations (15) and (16), the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,ℎ,𝑡, is a binary variable indicating 
whether household ℎ purchased leafy green 𝑖 in month 𝑡. The independent variables 
representing prices, 𝒑𝑘,ℎ,𝑡, are the average regional retail prices per ounce for all three 
leafy green types (romaine, iceberg, and spinach) faced by household ℎ in month 𝑡. The 
own effect, the impact of 𝑝𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 on the likelihood of purchasing leafy green 𝑖, is expected 
to be negative. That is, as price decreases, it is expected that the probability of purchasing 
increases. The cross effect, the impact of 𝑝𝑗,ℎ,𝑡 on the likelihood of purchasing leafy 
green 𝑖, is less certain. If leafy greens 𝑖 and 𝑗 are substitutes, the cross effect is expected 
to be positive.  
 Household demographic characteristics, 𝐈𝐍𝐂𝐎𝐌𝐄ℎ, 𝐇𝐇𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄ℎ, and 𝐂𝐇𝐈𝐋𝐃ℎ, that 
may impact the household likelihood of purchasing were also included as independent 
variables in the first specification, equation (15). Household income is reported by IRI as 
categorical variable. Thus, 𝐈𝐍𝐂𝐎𝐌𝐄ℎ is a vector of dummy variables indicating the 
income range of household h from the last year the household participated in the panel. 
Similarly, 𝐇𝐇𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄ℎ is a vector of dummy variables indicating the size of household ℎ 
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the last year the household participated in the panel. Household sizes range from one to 
eight individuals, and households with more than eight individuals are capped at eight. 
𝐂𝐇𝐈𝐋𝐃ℎ is a vector of dummy variables indicating households with young children 
(between the ages of 0 and 6), households with older children (between the ages of 6 and 
13), and households with teenagers (between the ages of 13 and 18). Lastly, 𝐌𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐇𝑡 is 
a vector of variables indicating the month of the year and 𝐘𝐄𝐀𝐑𝑡 is a vector of variables 
indicating the year. These time fixed effects were included to account for any seasonal 
trends in the demand for leafy greens.  
 In both specifications, the proxies for food safety information and the variables of 
greatest interest are the dummy variables representing recalls of leafy greens, 
𝐑𝐄𝐂𝐀𝐋𝐋𝑘,ℎ,𝑡, which is equal to one if a recall of leafy green 𝑘 (either combined leafy 
greens, romaine, iceberg, or spinach) occurred during month 𝑡 in the geographic region of 
household ℎ, and is equal to zero otherwise. Note that the geographic region of a recall 
was defined as the region specified by FDA in the corresponding press release. As a 
result of heightened awareness following recall events and the severity of the health 
consequences, recalls of leafy greens as a result of pathogen contamination may act as a 
negative signal with which consumers update their risk perceptions. Consequently, as 
consumer perception of food safety declines, the likelihood of purchasing the potentially 
contaminated food product also declines. This Bayesian risk revision process is outlined 
in greater detail in Chapter III. Thus, for example, a spinach recall due to pathogen 
contamination is expected to decrease the likelihood of purchasing spinach. Conversely, 
if consumers consider lettuce (romaine or iceberg) to be a safe alternative to spinach as 
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Arnade, Calvin, and Kuchler (2009) suggest, the likelihood of purchasing lettuce is 
expected to increase.  
Results 
The results for the linear probability models, the random-effects probit model, and the 
conditional fixed-effects logit model for combined leafy green purchases are presented in 
Appendix C and the results distinguishing between romaine, iceberg, and spinach 
purchases are presented in Appendix D. Across estimations, the data reveal significant 
own-price effects confirming standard demand theory. Moreover, the own-price effects 
were greater in magnitude than any other factor, suggesting that price was the most 
dominant factor when deciding to purchase leafy greens. With regards to cross-price 
effects, the results suggest that romaine and iceberg were substitute goods. That is, as the 
price of iceberg increased, the likelihood of purchasing romaine increased, and vice 
versa. The relationship between spinach and other lettuces was less straightforward. As 
the price of spinach increased, the likelihood of purchasing romaine decreased. Yet as the 
price of romaine and iceberg increased, the likelihood of purchasing spinach also 
increased. However, insignificant or weak cross-price relationships, particularly between 
lettuce and spinach, were also documented by Arnade, Calvin, and Kuchler (2009). 
 The results from the LP ordinary least squares [OLS] and RE probit estimations 
reveal the impact of demographic factors on the likelihood of purchasing leafy greens. 
Households with incomes below the median were less likely to purchase romaine and 
spinach, and more likely to purchase iceberg. Above the median, households were more 
likely to purchase romaine and spinach, and less likely to purchase iceberg. The 
magnitude of these impacts increased the further removed from the median household. 
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These results are intuitive as iceberg lettuce was significantly less expensive when 
compared to romaine and spinach (see table 11). In terms of household size, larger 
households were more likely to purchase iceberg lettuce and less likely to purchase 
spinach, and the magnitude of the impact increased as household size increased. This 
relationship did not hold for romaine lettuce, but single-person households were less 
likely to purchase romaine lettuce as compared to other households. Lastly, households 
with children under the age of 13 were less like to likely to purchase iceberg and more 
likely to purchase spinach, perhaps because spinach is richer in nutrients than iceberg. 
The parameters of greatest interest are the parameters corresponding to leafy green 
recall events. And to further interpret the results, the estimated coefficients were used to 
calculate average partial effects and odds ratios. The calculations for combined leafy 
green demand are presented in table 12. These results indicate that any leafy green recall 
event (whether romaine, iceberg, or spinach) had a negative but insignificant impact on 
the likelihood of purchasing a leafy green. Therefore, to determine whether households 
differentiated between risks linked to specific leafy greens, leafy green demand was 
further separated by variety. 
Table 12. Estimated Average Partial Effects and Odds Ratios for Combined Leafy 
Green Recall Events 
Average Partial Effects   
 LPM OLS LPM FE RE Probit 







Odds Ratios     
 LPM OLS LPM FE RE Probit FE Logit 
Leafy Green Recall 0.9903 0.9937 0.9937 0.9913 
Note: Using the delta method, asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five 
and one percent level, respectively. 
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The average partial effects and odds ratios for romaine, iceberg and spinach 
demand are presented in table 13. The own-recall effects (i.e., the impact of a romaine 
recall on the likelihood of purchasing romaine lettuce, etc.) were negative and significant 
when estimating the likelihood of purchasing romaine and iceberg, and negative but 
insignificant when estimating the demand for spinach. Furthermore, these results proved 
to be robust across empirical specifications. Thus, the results are consistent with 
expectations that recalls act as a negative signal with which consumers update their risk 
perceptions, thereby depressing the demand for the recalled product. In terms of cross-
recall effects (i.e., the impact of a romaine recall on the likelihood of purchasing another 
leafy green, etc.), romaine recalls have a negative and significant impact on the likelihood 
of purchasing iceberg lettuce and a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of 
purchasing spinach. In other words, romaine recalls also depressed the demand for 
iceberg (another lettuce), but increased the demand for spinach indicating that consumers 
may consider spinach to be a safer alternative to lettuce. Conversely, focusing on the RE 
probit and FE logit results, spinach recalls had a positive and significant impact on the 
likelihood of purchasing romaine suggesting that during spinach recalls, consumers 
consider romaine to be a safer alternative to spinach. Iceberg recalls, however, had a 
negative impact on the likelihood of purchasing leafy greens across the board. That is, 
iceberg recalls also had a significant negative impact on the likelihood of purchasing 
spinach and an insignificant negative impact on the likelihood of purchasing romaine. 
However, it should be noted that the iceberg recall parameter may be the weakest recall 
parameter because only three iceberg recall events occurred between the years 2008 and 
2012, as compared to romaine (18) and spinach (15).  
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Table 13. Estimated Average Partial Effects and Odds Ratios for Leafy Green 
Recall Events 
Average Partial Effects 
 Romaine Lettuce Iceberg Lettuce 


























































Romaine Recall 0.9883 0.9850 0.9878 0.9806 0.9648 0.9845 0.9791 0.9810 
Iceberg Recall 0.9833 0.9857 0.9814 0.9771 0.9651 0.9322 0.9406 0.9224 
Spinach Recall 1.0133 1.0159 1.0166 1.0231 0.9709 1.0006 0.9983 1.0026 
 
Average Partial Effects 
 Spinach 
































Romaine Recall 1.0380 1.0213 1.0243 1.0307 
Iceberg Recall 0.9164 0.9378 0.9367 0.9164 
Spinach Recall 0.9893 0.9932 0.9929 0.9906 
Note: Using the delta method, asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five 
and one percent level, respectively. 
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Ultimately, the results indicate that consumers do, in fact, react to food safety 
information, though the impact is small in magnitude relative to price and demographic 
factors. Also, the exact magnitude of impact varies by empirical specification; however, 
the differences between specifications are relatively minor, if not negligible. As 
mentioned earlier, one of the disadvantages of estimating an FE logit model (equation 
(14)) is the inability to estimate average partial effects. Thus, average partial effects were 
only estimated for the LP models and the RE probit model (table 13). Examining 
significant own-recall effects, the average impact across households of a romaine recall 
was a 0.12 to 0.16 percent reduction in the likelihood of purchasing romaine (depending 
on the specification). Similarly, the average impact of an iceberg recall was a 0.42 to 0.82 
percent reduction in the likelihood of purchasing iceberg. The magnitude of these impacts 
may seem inconsequential at less than one percent, but bear in mind that the likelihood of 
a household purchasing lettuce (either romaine or iceberg) within a given month was 
already small to begin with at approximately 13 percent.  
Though average partial effects cannot be estimated for the FE logit model, we can 





where Pr(RECALL = 1) is the probability of purchasing a leafy green (romaine lettuce, 
iceberg lettuce, or spinach) during the month of a recall event, 1 − Pr(RECALL = 1) is 
the probability of not purchasing a leafy green during the month of a recall event, and so 
on. To ensure that the results from all four empirical specifications are analogous, odds 
ratios for the LP models and RE probit model were also calculated using the coefficient 
results of Appendix D. Indeed, the estimated odds ratios are comparable across 
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estimations; the range of odds ratios for a romaine recall on the likelihood of purchasing 
romaine lettuce was 0.9806 to 0.9883 and the range of odds ratios for an iceberg recall on 
the likelihood of purchasing iceberg lettuce was 0.9224 to 0.9651. Put another way, 
during the month of a romaine recall, the odds of purchasing romaine decreased by 1.17 
to 1.94 percent and during the month of an iceberg recall, the odds of purchasing iceberg 
decreased by 3.49 to 7.76 percent.  
Households with higher incomes and/or households with children may be more 
sensitive to external signals when making purchasing decisions. To test this possibility, 
the LP model with household fixed effects was estimated with the inclusion of interaction 
terms between the recall variables and demographic variables (equation (18)).28  
𝑦𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏
′ 𝐑𝐄𝐂𝐀𝐋𝐋𝑘,ℎ,𝑡 + 𝜷𝟐
′ 𝐑𝐄𝐂𝐀𝐋𝐋𝑘,ℎ,𝑡 × INCOMEℎ
L 
+ 𝜷𝟑
′ 𝐑𝐄𝐂𝐀𝐋𝐋𝑘,ℎ,𝑡 × INCOMEℎ
H + 𝜷𝟒
′ 𝐑𝐄𝐂𝐀𝐋𝐋𝑘,ℎ,𝑡 × CHILDℎ
12 
+ 𝜸′𝒑𝑘,ℎ,𝑡 + 𝜿
′𝐌𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐇𝑡 + 𝝀
′𝐘𝐄𝐀𝐑𝑡 + 𝑐ℎ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑏,ℎ,𝑡. (18) 
Here, INCOMEL is an indicator of whether the household reported an income less than 
35,000, INCOMEH is an indicator of whether the household reported an income of 70,000 
or greater, and CHILD12 is a dummy variable indicating whether the household had 
children under 13. The results of these estimations, presented in table 14, reveal that there 
is no significant difference in response amongst households of different demographics, 
consistent with the results of Taylor, Klaiber, and Kuchler (2016). All households, 
regardless of children or income, were impacted by leafy green recalls to a certain extent. 
  
                                                     
28 As a robustness check, the RE probit model with recall and demographic interaction terms was also 
estimated, but the results did not significantly differ for LP model with household fixed effects. 
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Table 14. Estimated Fixed Effects LPM Coefficients for Leafy Green Demand with 
Demographic Interaction Terms 






















Household Income < $35,000 





















Household Income ≥ $70,000 





















Households with Children Under the Age 13 





















Note: Coefficient results for the other variables are suppressed for the purposes of clarity and 
comparison. Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five and one percent 
level, respectively. 
Given that leafy green recalls significantly impact household purchases of leafy 
greens, albeit marginally, an informative sensitivity exercise is to determine the duration 
of the effect – the length of time that a consumer was influenced by a recall event when 
making purchase decisions. Under the Bayesian framework of Chapter III, we expect that 
without any additional signals after an initial shock, consumer perception of risk, and 
subsequently demand, eventually return to baseline levels. Therefore, equation (16) was 
re-estimated as an LP model with household fixed-effects with the inclusion of three lag 
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variables: RECALLℎ,𝑡−1, RECALLℎ,𝑡−2, and RECALLℎ,𝑡−3. RECALLℎ,𝑡−1 is equal to one if 
a recall occurred within the previous month (month 𝑡 − 1) and is equal to zero 
otherwise,RECALLℎ,𝑡−2 is equal to one if a recall occurred at least two months ago 
(month 𝑡 − 2) and equal to zero otherwise, and so on. The results of these estimations, 
presented in table 15, reveal that households, for the most part, were influenced by leafy 
green recall events within the first month following the recall before reverting back to 
previous consumption behavior. Such short-term behavior modification with respect to 
food safety information is consistent with the findings of several previous empirical 
analyses (e.g., Dahlgran and Fairchild 2002; Piggott and Marsh 2004). However, these 
results differ from the results of Arnade, Kuchler, and Calvin (2011). They concluded 
that the spinach contamination event of 2006 impacted consumer purchases of bagged 
spinach for 8.5 weeks. However, Arnade, Kuchler, and Calvin analyzed the impact of a 
single, major event, whereas the present analysis considers the impact of multiple 
smaller, delineated events, which may account for the difference in results.  
The one exception in terms of duration of impact was the impact of iceberg recalls 
on the likelihood of purchasing iceberg lettuce, which was positive and significant in the 
second and third month following the initial recall month. One explanation for this 
positive lag impact may be some sort of rebound effect; after forgoing to purchase 
iceberg lettuce for a period of time, households may have been anxious to purchase again 
after they deemed a sufficient amount of time had elapsed since the initial negative 
signal. Another possibility may be that recalls serve as a short-run negative signal for 
food safety; but in the long-run, also serve as a positive signal for food supply oversight. 
That is, in the long-run, recalls may signal that federal authorities are adequately 
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monitoring the nation’s food supply by removing contaminated food products from the 
marketplace. Thus, following an initial shock, overall faith in the system is improved, 
resulting in a positive lag impact.29 
Table 15. Estimated Fixed Effects LPM Coefficients for Leafy Green Demand with 
Lag Terms 
Duration of the Recall Effect 
Romaine Lettuce 
Month 1 (RECALLℎ,𝑡) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0005) 
Month 2 (RECALLℎ,𝑡−1) 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
Month 3 (RECALLℎ,𝑡−2) 
-0.0009 
(0.0005) 




Month 1 (RECALLℎ,𝑡) 
-0.0083** 
(0.0013) 
Month 2 (RECALLℎ,𝑡−1) 
0.0020 
(0.0013) 
Month 3 (RECALLℎ,𝑡−2) 
0.0081** 
(0.0013) 




Month 1 (RECALLℎ,𝑡) 
-0.0003 
(0.0006) 
Month 2 (RECALLℎ,𝑡−1) 
0.0002 
(0.0006) 
Month 3 (RECALLℎ,𝑡−2) 
0.0002 
(0.0006) 
Month 4 (RECALLℎ,𝑡−3) 
-0.0001 
(0.0006) 
Note: Coefficient results for the other variables are suppressed for purposes of clarity and 
comparison. Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five and one percent 
level, respectively.  
                                                     
29 However, as mentioned earlier, the iceberg recall parameters may be the weakest recall parameters 
because only three iceberg recall events occurred between the years 2008 and 2012. 
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Lastly, to further interpret the results, predicted probabilities from the LP model 
with household fixed effects were used to approximate the fiscal impacts of nationwide 
romaine and iceberg recalls. When households purchased leafy greens in the IRI 
Consumer Network, they purchased a monthly median amount of 18 ounces of romaine 
lettuce and 16 ounces of iceberg lettuce at an average of 0.219 dollars per ounce and 
0.145 dollars per ounce, respectively. Using these figures, national household population 
estimates for 2008 to 2012, 30 and the predicted probabilities that a household purchased 
romaine or iceberg lettuce during a month with and without a recall, the estimate of 
romaine lettuce revenue loss from a nationwide romaine recall was approximately 
635,000 dollars or 1.3 percent of monthly industry revenues. The loss of iceberg lettuce 
revenues from an iceberg lettuce recall was even greater at approximately 1.94 million 
dollars or 5.9 percent of monthly industry revenues. However, these estimates only 
consider significant own-recall effects and ignore significant negative and positive cross-
recall effects. Moreover, the estimates of revenue loss only account for packaged leafy 
green products, and do not include bulk, random-weight leafy greens and leafy greens 
sold through other marketing channels (foodservice, institutional, etc.). 
Conclusion 
The objective of this analysis was to investigate the impact of food safety information on 
the demand for leafy greens. Analyzing disaggregated household purchase data and FDA 
leafy green recall data, the results reveal that recall events had a statistically significant 
                                                     
30 The source for household population was the U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community 
Survey 5-Year Estimates. Additionally, we assumed only 89 percent of households consumed leafy greens 




impact on leafy green consumption, though the impact was small relative to price and 
demographic factors and often disappeared after a month’s time. Specifically, the own-
recall effects were negative and significant when estimating the likelihood of purchasing 
romaine and iceberg lettuce; the cross-recall effects were negative and significant when 
estimating the impact of romaine recalls on the likelihood of purchasing iceberg lettuce 
and when estimating the impact of iceberg recalls on the likelihood of purchasing 
spinach; and lastly, the cross-recall effects were positive and significant when estimating 
the impact of romaine recalls on the likelihood of purchasing spinach and vice versa. 
The final results are mainly consistent with much of the existing empirical 
literature, in that the results provide further evidence that food safety information has 
negative effects on the demand for the contaminated product involved (Smith, van 
Ravenswaay, and Thompson 1988; Foster and Just 1989; Burton and Young 1996; 
Dahlgran and Fairchild 2002; Marsh, Schroeder, and Mintert 2004; Piggott and Marsh 
2004; Shimshack, Ward, and Beatty 2007; Arnade, Calvin, and Kuchler 2009; Tonsor, 
Mintert, and Schroeder 2010; Arnade, Kuchler, and Calvin 2011), significant cross 
effects on the demand for other products (Burton and Young 1996; Marsh, Schroeder, 
and Mintert 2004; Piggott and Marsh 2004; Arnade, Calvin, and Kuchler 2009; Tonsor, 
Mintert, and Schroeder 2010), and eventually return to initial demand levels (Dahlgran 
and Fairchild 2002; Piggott and Marsh 2004). However, the present results differ in 
several critical ways. First, using household locational data, the present study addresses 
the regional nature of most recall events by identifying and analyzing the purchases of 
households experiencing a recall in their geographic region in any given monthly period. 
Second, in direct contrast with studies that have aggregated data across quarters or greater 
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time periods, the chosen monthly periodicity allows for the analysis of immediate short-
run impacts. This distinction is of particular importance given that, the results reveal that 
the impact of recall events of leafy green consumption generally did not last for more 
than one month. Third, and lastly, as opposed to studies analyzing aggregate consumption 
data, the present study considers possible heterogeneity of household responses and 
interaction terms of recalls with household income and composition. Ultimately, the 
results reveal that all households were significantly affected by recall events, independent 
of household income and composition.  
The dramatic increase in the number of incidents of foodborne illness linked to 
leafy greens and the number of leafy green products recalled over the past decade 
highlights the need for a complete understanding of consumer behavior in response to 
leafy green recalls. The present results indicate that despite the removal of contaminated 
leafy green products from retail locations, some consumers responded to recall events by 
deciding not to purchase the implicated green in the weeks immediately following. This 
observation suggests that at least some consumers use recall events to gauge product 
quality and safety, and that they believe recall events signal lower quality, riskier 
products. In turn, this translates to lost sales for all leafy green producers, not just the 
firm liable for the contaminated product. Thus, greater consumer education and 
awareness with regards to the safety and quality of the products that remain on the market 
following a recall may lessen the magnitude of the impact and benefit the industry as a 
whole. Additionally, a reduction in recalls through increased protection against bacterial 
contamination may have the potential to further benefit both consumers and producers.  
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V. Demand Impacts of Ground Beef Product Recalls 
Escherichia coli (E. coli) are a large and diverse group of bacteria found in the 
environment, foods, and intestines of humans and animals. Most E. coli bacteria are 
harmless; however a small group of E. coli produce a Shiga toxin (Shiga toxin-producing 
E. coli or STEC) that may cause severe damage to the lining of the intestine. The actual 
infectious dose is unknown, but most scientists believe it takes only a small amount to 
cause serious illness and even death, especially in children and older adults (FSIS 2016). 
Illnesses caused to STEC, most notably E. coli O157:H7, are frequently linked to the 
consumption of undercooked ground beef. Between 1982 and 2002, ground beef was the 
most common vehicle for E. coli O157:H7 foodborne illness outbreaks (Rangel et al. 
2005). More recently, between 1998 and 2008, beef was again the most common vehicle 
for STEC foodborne illness outbreaks (Gould 2013). Naturally, ground beef poses a 
greater health risk than other cuts of beef because of the risk of possible cross-
contamination from grinding.  
Concerns of bacterial contamination and foodborne illness have the strong potential 
to influence the demand for ground beef. As theorized in Chapter III and demonstrated in 
Chapter IV with leafy green recalls, recalls signal negative information to consumers 
about relative health risks. Recently, Taylor, Klaiber, and Kuchler (2016) confirmed this 
relationship with ground beef. They estimated the impact of ground beef recalls on 
consumer demand for ground beef between January 2002 and December 2005 and found 
clear, significant evidence of a structural change in these impacts following the discovery 
of a BSE-positive cow in the United States in December 2003. That is, they found ground 
beef recalls had no impact on household purchases of ground beef prior to the discover of 
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BSE in the United States, but following the 2003 BSE discovery event, consumers 
responded to ground beef recall events by purchasing significantly less ground beef.  
The primary objective of this chapter is to investigate the effect of STEC-
contaminated ground beef recalls on the demand for ground beef products with updated 
data. Using disaggregated household demographic and purchasing data, this study 
effectively takes advantage of the temporal and geographic variability of STEC 
contaminated ground beef recalls in order to accurately measure the impact of food safety 
information on the demand for ground beef products. Most importantly, however, the 
present analysis also considers the strength of the signal. That is, in contrast to Taylor, 
Klaiber, and Kuchler (2016) and the leafy green analysis of the previous chapter, the 
present analysis differentiates between recalls prompted by consumer illness 
investigations and recalls prompted by pathogen testing. Assuming consumers perceive 
recalls prompted consumer illnesses to be stronger health risk signals than recalls 
prompted by laboratory testing, then, as demonstrated by the Bayesian theoretical 
framework of Chapter III, the impact of recalls prompted by consumer illnesses is 
expected to be greater than the impact of recalls prompted by pathogen testing. 
Additionally, the length of time to recovery, the time needed to return to baseline 
purchasing behavior, is also expected to be greater following recalls prompted by 
consumer illnesses.   
Ground Beef Recall Data 
Information about ground beef recall events was gathered from FSIS press releases, 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter I. Every recall under FSIS authority is the subject of 
a press release with very few exceptions. Between 2008 and 2012, FSIS oversaw 377 
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recall events; 106 (28 percent) of which were beef or veal products. Of these 106 beef 
and veal recalls, 58 (55 percent) were ground beef products recalled due to STEC 
contamination. STEC contamination accounted for 75 percent of all ground beef recall 
events, and details of these 58 recall events are summarized in table 16. Relevant to the 
present analysis, note that 17 of the 58 recall events (29 percent) were the result of a 
consumer illness investigation and the remaining 41 recall events were the result of 
pathogen discovery through laboratory testing. Thus, ground beef recalls provide an 
excellent case study to analyze the impact of signal strength because there exists 
sufficient variability in the number of recalls prompted by consumer illness outbreaks and 
the number of recalls prompted by pathogen testing. 
Table 16. Summary Statistics of STEC Ground Beef Recall Events, 2008-2012 
 2008a 2009 2010 2011 2012 Totala 
Total STEC Ground 
Beef Recall Events 
15 16 10 12 5 58 
Nationwide Events 3 3 0 0 0 6 
Events Linked to a 
Consumer Illness 
6 5 3 2 1 17 
Mean Recall 
Quantity (lbs.) 
548,278 85,506 705,065 81,694 12,693 296,253 
Standard Error (lbs.) 409,002 42,360 570,345 33,220 6,936 139,702 
Maximum Recall 
Quantity (lbs.) 
5,300,000 545,699 5,764,000 377,775 38,200 5,764,000 
Minimum Recall 
Quantity (lbs.) 
345 68 2,574 500 2,057 68 
Total No. of Pounds 
Recalled (lbs.) 
7,127,608 1,368,100 7,050,647 980,331 63,467 16,590,153 
Total No. of Pounds 
Recovered (lbs.) 
2,701,999 540,757 398,826 432,038b 339,062 4,412,682b 
a Recall quantity data were not available for two recalls in 2008. 
b Pounds recovered data were not available for one recall in 2011. 
As in the previous chapter, the greatest advantage of using multiple recall events 
to measure the impact of food safety information is the temporal and geographic 
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variability. Of the 58 ground beef recall events due to STEC contamination, only six 
included ground beef products that were distributed nationwide. The remaining recalled 
products were distributed to regions identified by the firm and FSIS in the press release, 
and the size of the affected regions ranged from a single city or county to several states. 
For example, the average regional recall impacted three states, while the most expansive 
regional recall impacted 34 states. 
Household Demographic and Purchasing Data 
Once more, the primary dataset used in this analysis is the IRI Consumer Network™. The 
years of interest were 2008 to 2012 and the product of interest was fresh or frozen 
packaged, uniform-weight ground beef. The data on ground beef purchases include a 
detailed product description, date of purchase, total quantity, and total expenditure for 
every item. The data of household demographics include county of residence, household 
composition, household size, income, education, age, and race. As explained in greater 
detail in Chapter IV, the demographics data contain only a snapshot of household 
characteristics from 2012 or the last year each household reported demographic data. 
 A drawback of the IRI Consumer Network is that static households only record 
and report their purchases of uniform-weight, UPC-coded products. For commodities like 
ground beef, which is often sold as a store-packed, random-weight product, this may 
create a problem as the data ignore a significant share of the market. Though it is not 
possible to consider the impact of ground beef recalls on random-weight purchases from 
2008 to 2012, it is possible to compare trends in household expenditures on random-
weight and uniform-weight ground beef purchases for 2012 and 2013. For the subset of 
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households participating in the random-weight consumer panel in 2012 and 2013, figure 
13 plots total monthly expenditures on random-weight and uniform-weight ground beef.  
 
Figure 13. Total Monthly Expenditures on Random Weight and Uniform Weight  
Ground Beef Products, 2012-2013.  
Data: Random Weight Static Households, IRI Consumer Network.31 
Expenditures on random-weight ground beef were roughly twice as much as 
expenditures on uniform-weight ground beef; however, the purchasing patterns between 
random-weight and uniform-weight ground beef appear to be strongly correlated. In fact, 
the Pearson correlation coefficient between random-weight expenditures and uniform-
weight expenditures is 0.65. This positive correlation suggests that the demand impacts of 
STEC-contaminated ground beef recall events on uniform-weight ground beef purchases 
are likely analogous to the impacts on random-weight ground beef purchases. 
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Several additional specifications were made to further aid analysis. First, a 
monthly periodicity was chosen to avoid high censoring rates, while still remaining 
precise enough to examine short-run food safety effects. Of the households that 
purchased ground beef products within a surveyed year, the average number of packaged 
ground beef products purchased was four. And of households that purchased a ground 
beef product within a surveyed month, 74 percent purchased only one packaged ground 
beef product. Given that the majority of households that purchased a ground beef product 
within a given month only purchased ground beef once, a monthly periodicity is 
justifiable. Additionally, if a household recorded no purchases in a given month, ground 
beef or otherwise, the month was omitted from analysis.  
 Second, only households that purchased packaged ground beef products at least 
once during the surveyed period were considered for analysis. By only analyzing the 
consumption behavior of these households, we focus our attention on the households that 
were most likely to be impacted by ground beef recall events. Thus, the final dataset was 
reduced from 106,718 static households to 67,446 households. Summary statistics of 
selected characteristics of participating households as compared to the full IRI panel and 
Census figures are presented in table 17. The households selected for analysis had an 
average number of persons per household of 2.60,32 almost exactly the same as the 
national average household size estimated by the Census Bureau, 2.61. Households also 
had a median annual income range of 50,000 to 59,999 dollars, consistent with the 
                                                     
32 Mean household size may be biased downwards because the number of reported individuals per 
household is capped at eight. However, households of eight or more members only account for 0.48 percent 
of households in the final panel. 
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Census Bureau statistic of $53,046.33 And lastly, 26.5 percent of selected households 
included an individual under the age of 18. 
Table 17. Selected Demographic Distributions from the IRI Consumer Network (%) 
 
Censusa Full IRI Static Panel Final Panel Dataset 
Household Size    
 1 27.5 23.0 18.7 
 2 33.5 41.2 41.8 




 5 5.4 6.1 
 6 2.1 2.5 
 7 0.7 0.8 
 8+ 0.4 0.5 
Household Income    
$0-$14,999 12.6 6.9 6.6 
$15,000-$24,999 10.7 9.7 9.6 
$25,000-$34,999 10.4 12.6 12.7 




$60,000-$69,999 8.1 8.3 
$70,000-$99,999 19.7 19.9 
$100,000+ 22.2 15.2 14.5 
Presence of Children    
Children under 18 32.8 24.2 26.5 
No children under 18 67.2 75.8 73.5 
No. of Households 115,226,802 106,718 67,446 
a Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
Third, and lastly, price per ounce of ground beef was calculated by dividing total 
monthly expenditures (dollars) by total monthly quantity purchased (ounces). However, 
as in the previous chapter, the analysis could not depend on observed prices alone. 
Therefore, once again, the average regional price from store-sales data was calculated for 
                                                     
33 Household income is reported by IRI as a categorical variable, not a continuous variable.  
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each of the 73 IRI-defined markets. Table 18 summarizes and compares average retail 
regional prices with observed prices. 
Table 18. Summary Statistics of Observed and Average Regional Prices for Ground 
Beef 
 
No. of Observations Mean Price ($/oz.) Standard Deviation 
Observed 446,914 0.187 0.068 
Regional Average 2,446,036a 0.195 0.030 
a The total number of household month observations is 2,446,480. The average regional retail 
prices for packaged ground beef are not complete because the price for ground beef was not 
available for the Boise, ID market in July 2008, September 2008, October 2008, and December 
2011 and not available for the Syracuse, NY market in November 2008. As no ground beef 
products were recalled in these regions during the specified months, these missing price 
observations should not significantly impact results. 
Empirical Estimation 
The disaggregated household IRI panel and the FSIS recall data allow for a unique 
empirical analysis of the impact of food safety information on household ground beef 
purchases. As in Chapter IV, demand was estimated using a binary response model, the 
general formulation of which is expressed by equation (11). That is, the focus of this 
analysis was on the household decision to purchase rather than the quantitative decision 
of how much to purchase (given that the household had already decided to buy). 
 Following the outline of the previous chapter, four methods were employed to 
estimate the binary response model: a linear probability [LP] model with time-invariant 
demographic variables; an LP model with household fixed effects (equation (12)); a 
random-effects [RE] probit model (equation (13)), and a conditional fixed-effects [FE] 
logit model (equation (14)). Household demand for ground beef was estimated with the 




𝑦ℎ,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝐶𝐼 + 𝛽2RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝑃𝑇 + 𝛾𝑝ℎ,𝑡 + 𝛅
′𝐈𝐍𝐂𝐎𝐌𝐄ℎ 
+𝜻′𝐇𝐇𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄ℎ  +  𝜽
′𝐂𝐇𝐈𝐋𝐃ℎ + 𝜿
′𝐌𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐇𝑡 + 𝝀
′𝐘𝐄𝐀𝐑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑏,ℎ,𝑡. (19) 
And demand was estimated using the LP model with household fixed effects and the FE 
logit model with the following specification: 
𝑦ℎ,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝐶𝐼 + 𝛽2RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝑃𝑇 + 𝛾𝑝ℎ,𝑡 + 𝜿
′𝐌𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐇𝑡 + 𝝀
′𝐘𝐄𝐀𝐑𝑡 
+𝑐ℎ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑏,ℎ,𝑡. (20) 
In both equations (19) and (20), the dependent variable, 𝑦ℎ,𝑡, is a binary variable 
indicating whether household ℎ purchased packaged ground beef in month 𝑡. The 
independent variable representing price, 𝑝ℎ,𝑡, is the average regional retail price per 
ounce of packaged ground beef faced by household ℎ in month 𝑡. The impact of 𝑝ℎ,𝑡 on 
the likelihood of purchasing ground beef is, of course, expected to be negative. In 
equation (19), independent variables representing household demographic characteristics, 
𝐈𝐍𝐂𝐎𝐌𝐄ℎ, 𝐇𝐇𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄ℎ, and 𝐂𝐇𝐈𝐋𝐃ℎ, were also included as they may also impact the 
likelihood a household purchased ground beef.34 𝐈𝐍𝐂𝐎𝐌𝐄ℎ is a vector of dummy 
variables indicating the income range of household h from the last year the household 
participated in the panel. 𝐇𝐇𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄ℎ is a vector of dummy variables indicating the size of 
household ℎ the last year the household participated in the panel. And 𝐂𝐇𝐈𝐋𝐃ℎ is a 
vector of dummy variables indicating households with young children (between the ages 
of 0 and 6), households with older children (between the ages of 6 and 13), and 
households with teenagers (between the ages of 13 and 18). Lastly, time fixed effects 
were included in both specifications to account for any seasonal trends in the demand for 
                                                     
34 However, the time-invariant demographic variables are eliminated from the LP model with household 
fixed effects and the FE logit model due to collinearity. 
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ground beef. 𝐌𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐇𝑡 is a vector of variables indicating the month of the year and 
𝐘𝐄𝐀𝐑𝑡 is a vector of variables indicating the year. 
For both specifications, the proxies for food safety information and the variables 
of greatest interest, are the dummy variables representing recalls of ground beef, 
RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝐶𝐼  and RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝑃𝑇 . RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝐶𝐼  is equal to one if a STEC-contaminated ground 
beef recall following a consumer illness investigation occurred during month 𝑡 in the 
geographic region of household ℎ, and is equal to zero otherwise. Similarly, RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝑃𝑇  is 
equal to one if a STEC-contaminated ground beef recall following pathogen testing 
occurred during month 𝑡 in the geographic region of household ℎ, and is equal to zero 
otherwise. Note that the geographic region of a recall was defined as the region specified 
by FSIS in the corresponding press release. As a result of heightened awareness 
following recall events and the severity of the health consequences, recalls of STEC-
contaminated ground beef may act as a negative signal with which consumers update 
their risk perceptions. Consequently, as consumer perception of food safety declines, the 
likelihood of purchasing the potentially contaminated food product also declines. 
Furthermore, stronger signals, such as recalls prompted by illness outbreaks (RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝐶𝐼 ) 
likely have a greater impact on the likelihood of purchasing ground beef than weaker 
signals, such as recalls prompted by laboratory testing (RECALLℎ,𝑡
𝑃𝑇 ). Motivations and 
predictions for the empirical specification are outlined in greater detail by the Bayesian 
theoretical framework of a utility maximizing consumer facing risk uncertainty in 





The results from the linear probability models, the random-effects probit model, and the 
conditional fixed-effects logit model are presented in Appendix E. Across estimations, 
the data reveal significant price effects validating a priori expectations. Moreover, the 
price effects were greater in magnitude than any other factor, suggesting that price was 
the most dominant factor when deciding to purchase packaged ground beef.  
 The results from the LP ordinary least squares [OLS] and RE probit estimations 
reveal the impact of demographic factors. Households with incomes below the median 
were more likely to purchase packaged ground beef, and households with incomes above 
the median were less likely to purchase ground beef, with demand declining as household 
income increased. These results suggest that as income increases, households abandon 
packaged meat purchases and perhaps opt for other products, such as finer cuts of meat or 
deli-counter (butchered) ground beef that are sold without UPC codes. In terms of 
household size, larger households were more likely to purchase packaged ground beef 
and the magnitude of the impact increased as household size increased. Lastly, 
households with young children (under the age of six) were less likely to purchase 
packaged ground beef, and according to the RE probit results, households with teenagers 
(individuals between the age of 13 and 18) were more likely to purchase packaged 
ground beef. 
Of course, the variables of greatest interest are those corresponding to ground 
beef recall events. To further make sense of the results and to compare values across 
models, the estimated coefficients were used to calculate average partial effects and odds 
ratios. These calculations are presented in table 19. Across estimations, the recall 
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parameters, both for recalls prompted by consumer illness investigations and those 
prompted by pathogen testing, were negative and significant at the five or one percent 
level when estimating the likelihood of purchasing packaged ground beef. Thus, the 
results are consistent with expectations that recalls act as a negative signal with which 
consumers update their perceptions of risk, thereby depressing the demand for the 
recalled product. Examining differences in pathogen discovery, the results from the LPM 
FE, RE probit, and FE logit estimations indicate that consumer illness recalls had a 
greater impact than pathogen testing recalls. This suggests that recalls prompted by 
confirmed illnesses are stronger signals than recalls prompted by pathogen testing 
because consumers were more responsive to the former, though tests of equality could 
not be rejected at the five percent level.35 
Table 19. Estimated Average Partial Effects and Odds Ratios for Ground Beef 
Recall Events 
Average Partial Effects   
 LPM OLS LPM FE RE Probit 














Odds Ratios     
 LPM OLS LPM FE RE Probit FE Logit 
Consumer Illness Recall 0.9664 0.9762 0.9703 0.9658 
Pathogen Testing Recall 0.9315 0.9860 0.9763 0.9801 
Note: Using the delta method, asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five 
and one percent level, respectively. 
                                                     
35 The p-values to test the equality of the consumer illness recall coefficient and the pathogen testing recall 
coefficient were 0.2169 for the LP model with household fixed effects, 0.4636 for the RE probit model, and 
0.1574 for the FE logit model.  
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 The results indicate that consumers may, indeed, consider signal content and 
interpret signals with varying levels of information differently. The exact magnitude of 
impact varies by empirical specification. As described in Chapter IV, one of the 
disadvantages of estimating an FE logit model (equation (16)) is the inability to estimate 
average partial effects. Thus, average partial effects were only estimated for the LP 
models and the RE probit model. Examining the significant effects from the FE LP and 
RE probit models,36 the average impact across households of a STEC ground beef recall 
due to pathogen testing was a 0.21 to 0.38 percent reduction in the likelihood of 
purchasing packaged ground beef products (with significance at the five percent level). 
The average impact of a recall due to a consumer illness investigation was greater at a 
0.36 to 0.47 percent reduction in the likelihood of purchasing packaged ground beef 
products (with significance at the one percent level). The magnitude of these impacts may 
seem insignificant at less than one percent, but note that the likelihood of a household 
purchasing packaged ground beef within a given month was already small to begin with 
at approximately 18 percent. 
 Though average partial effects cannot be estimated for the FE logit model, it is 
possible to estimate odds ratios (equation 19). So, to compare the results across all four 
empirical specifications, odds ratios for the LP models and RE probit models were also 
calculated using the coefficient results of Appendix E. Depending on the specification, 
the range of odds ratios for a pathogen testing recall on the likelihood of purchasing 
packaged ground beef was 0.9763 to 0.9860 and the range of odds ratios for a consumer 
                                                     
36 The average partial effects from the LPM OLS estimation are not included in the discussion given the 
relatively low R-squared value, which is problematic for precise predictions. Moreover, the results from the 
LPM OLS model differ considerably from the other three other models.  
89 
 
illness recall was 0.9658 to 0.9762. Put another way, during the month of pathogen 
testing recall, the odds of purchasing packaged ground beef decreased by 1.40 to 2.37 
percent, and during the month of a consumer illness recall, the odds decreased by 2.38 to 
3.42 percent. 
 The extent to which households respond to recall events may vary by 
demographic factors, such as income and the presence of children. To test this possibility, 
the LP model with household fixed effects was estimated with the inclusion of interaction 
terms between the recall variables and demographic variables (equation (21)).  




















′𝐘𝐄𝐀𝐑𝑡 + 𝑐ℎ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑏,ℎ,𝑡.  (21) 
Here, INCOMEL, an indicator of whether the household reported an income less than 
35,000; INCOMEH, an indicator of whether the household reported an income of 70,000 
or greater; and CHILD12, a dummy variable indicating whether the household had 
children under 13. The results of these estimations, presented in table 20, reveal that there 
is no significant difference in response amongst households of different demographics (at 
the one percent level), consistent with the results of Chapter IV and Taylor, Klaiber, and 
Kuchler (2016). All households, regardless of children or income, were impacted by 





Table 20. Estimated Fixed Effects LPM Coefficients for Ground Beef Demand with 




Consumer Illness Recall 
-0.0033** 
(0.0013) 
Pathogen Testing Recall 
-0.0008 
(0.0016) 
Household Income < $35,000 
Consumer Illness Recall × INCOMEL 
-0.0043* 
(0.0018) 
Pathogen Testing Recall × INCOMEL 
-0.0016 
(0.0023) 
Household Income ≥ $70,000  
Consumer Illness Recall × INCOMEH 
-0.0032 
(0.0021) 
Pathogen Testing Recall × INCOMEH 
0.0008 
(0.0018) 
Households with Children Under the Age 13 
Consumer Illness Recall × CHILD12 
0.0055* 
(0.0025) 
Pathogen Testing Recall × CHILD12 
0.0022 
(0.0030) 
Note: Coefficient results for the other variables are suppressed for purposes of clarity and 
comparison. Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five and one percent 
level, respectively. 
Lastly, under the Bayesian framework of Chapter III, we expect that after the 
initial impact of a recall, consumer perception of risk, and subsequently demand, 
eventually return to baseline levels. The length of time to recovery is a function of the 
strength of the signal and the weight consumers place on their own experiences versus 
negative information signals, and we expect stronger signals to require greater recovery 
times. To test this hypothesis, equation (20) was re-estimated as an LP model with 






PT , and RECALLℎ,𝑡−2
PT .37 
                                                     
37 Four lag variables for consumer illness recalls and two lag variables for pathogen testing recalls were 




CI  is equal to one if a consumer illness recall occurred within the previous 
month (month 𝑡 − 1) and is equal to zero otherwise, RECALLℎ,𝑡−2
CI  is equal to one if a 
recall occurred at least two months ago (month 𝑡 − 2) and equal to zero otherwise, and so 
on.  
The results of these estimations, presented in table 21, reveal that households 
were influenced by ground beef recall events prompted by pathogen testing for the first 
month following the recall event before reverting back to previous consumption behavior, 
though this result is statistically different from zero only at the five percent level. In 
contrast, households were influenced by ground beef recall events prompted by consumer 
illness investigations for nearly three months following the recall event. While the 
estimated coefficient for the first lag variable is not significantly different from zero, the 
coefficient for the second lag variable is statistically different from zero and smaller in 
magnitude than the coefficient for the initial recall month. The coefficients for the third 
and fourth lag variables are smaller still and statistically insignificant, suggesting the 




Table 21. Estimated Fixed Effects LPM Coefficients for Ground Beef Demand with 
Lag Terms 
Duration of the Recall Effect 


































Note: Coefficient results for other variables are suppressed for purposes of clarity and 
comparison. Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five and one percent 
level, respectively. 
 To further interpret the results, predicted probabilities from the LP model with 
household fixed effects were used to approximate the fiscal impacts of nationwide ground 
beef recalls. When households purchased packaged ground beef in the IRI Consumer 
Network, they purchased a monthly median amount of 48 ounces at an average of 0.195 
dollars per ounce. Using these figures, national household population estimates for 2008 
to 2012,38 and the predicted probabilities that a household purchased packaged ground 
beef during a month with and with a recall, the estimate of ground beef revenue loss from 
a nationwide recall prompted by pathogen testing was approximately 1.43 million dollars 
                                                     
38 The source for household population was the U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community 
Survey 5-Year Estimates. Additionally, we assumed only 63 percent of households consumed packaged 
ground beef given that only 63 percent of households participating in the IRI Consumer Network purchased 
packaged ground beef. 
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or 1.2 percent of monthly industry revenues for packaged ground beef. The loss of 
ground beef revenues from a ground beef recall prompted by consumer illness 
investigations was nearly twice as large at approximately 2.44 million dollars or 2.0 
percent of monthly industry revenues for packaged ground beef. These estimates 
represent a lower bound. Actual revenue loss could potentially be much greater if we 
were to also account for the loss of revenues from random-weight ground beef products 
and ground beef products sold through other marketing channels (foodservice, 
institutional, etc.). For comparison, consider that the average amount of ground beef 
recalled due to STEC contamination between 2008 and 2012 was 296,253 pounds (table 
15). At an average price per pound of 3.12 dollars, the direct revenue loss was on average 
924,309 dollars per recall, considerably less than the industry retail revenue loss due to 
decreased demand for packaged ground beef products. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this analysis was to investigate the impact of food safety information on 
the demand for ground beef and to determine whether consumers respond differently to 
varying levels of information. Analyzing disaggregated household purchase data and 
FSIS recall data, the results reveal that recall events did in fact have a significant impact 
on packaged ground beef consumption, though the impact was small relative to price and 
demographic factors. Specifically, a recall prompted by pathogen testing had a negative 
and significant impact on the likelihood of purchasing ground beef and the impact 
persisted for a month. A recall prompted by a consumer illness investigation also had a 
negative and significant impact on the likelihood of purchasing ground beef, but the 
magnitude of impact was greater and persisted for three months. 
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 As in the previous chapter, the present study takes full advantage of the inherent 
temporal and geographic variability of ground beef recall events by analyzing 
disaggregated household data. That is, the study addresses the regional nature of most 
recall events by identifying and analyzing the purchases of households in the geographic 
regions under recall advisories as compared to the rest of the nation, and the study 
addresses the immediate short-run impacts of recall events by analyzing monthly 
household purchases. Additionally, the study considers possible household heterogeneity 
by including recall interaction terms with household income and composition, and the 
results reveal that all households were significantly affected by recall events to a certain 
extent. 
 Perhaps the most important contribution of this analysis to the existing literature, 
however, is the differentiation between recalls prompted by consumer illness 
investigations and recalls prompted by laboratory testing. As modeled in Chapter III, 
consumers update their perceptions of risk and their decision rules based on information 
received through external signals. The strength of the signal and the information 
conveyed affects the magnitude of the demand impacts and the length of time for 
recovery, and stronger signals have greater demand impacts and longer recovery periods. 
Ground beef recalls provide a natural case study to empirically test the impact of varying 
signal strength as there is sufficient variation in the information conveyed regarding 
health risk discovery, while maintaining constant the actual health risk and risk severity. 
That is, of the 58 Class I ground beef recall events due to STEC contamination, 17 were 
the result of a consumer illness investigation and 41 were the result of pathogen 
discovery through laboratory testing. The results from the analysis reveal that recalls 
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prompted by consumer illness investigations had a greater and longer-lasting impact on 
consumer purchases decisions than recalls prompted by pathogen testing, suggesting that 
consumers perceive recalls with confirmed reports of foodborne illnesses to be stronger 
information signals than recalls following laboratory tests.  
 Despite the removal of contaminated ground beef products from the marketplace, 
consumers responded to recall events by deciding not to purchases ground beef in the 
weeks and months immediately following the recall event. Consumers used recall events 
to gauge product quality and safety, and the information contained within the recall 
announcement was used to evaluate potential risk. Recalls prompted by foodborne illness 
outbreaks communicated a greater risk to consumers than recalls prompted by laboratory 
testing. This translates to lost sales for all ground beef producers, not just the firm liable 
for the contaminated product. Thus, increased protection against bacterial contamination 
to ensure that fewer recalls occur may have the potential to benefit both consumers and 





The presence of unsafe foods in markets is primarily the result of imperfect information. 
Without perfect information, consumers cannot differentiate products based on health 
risks and producers lose incentive to follow safe production practices because they cannot 
price products to account for the additional expense of implementing these safe practices. 
Therefore, the federal government must take measures to ensure that the nation’s food 
supply is safe by engaging in preventive actions to protect consumers, including 
overseeing the recall of risky products from the marketplace. The primary objective of 
this dissertation was to provide an in-depth exploration of the trends and demand impacts 
of food product recalls. Insights from this investigation may provide targets for both 
manufacturer food safety practices and regulatory oversight. Moreover, any information 
regarding changes in consumer behavior in response to food safety risks is of valuable 
interest to both producers and regulators of the industry in order to determine the welfare 
benefits associated with increased food safety measures. 
 The first chapter analyzed trends and patterns in food product recall events from 
2004 to 2013. During the course of the decade, food product recall events increased by 
10.1 percent a year, with recall events increasing across several major aggregate food 
categories and across every risk class. Additionally, the results highlighted the extensive 
impact of ingredient-driven recalls on downstream manufacturers and the significant 
increase in recalls due to undeclared allergens. The second chapter reviewed the 
extensive literature on the impact of food safety information on consumer demand. For 
the most part, the existing literature is comprised of analyses of media indices, singular 
events, and aggregate data, whereas the present case studies analyzed disaggregated 
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household purchase data and clearly delineated multiple recall events. The third chapter 
developed a general model to illustrate how consumers form perceptions of risk based on 
personal experiences and external signals, such as recall events, and how perception of 
risk in turn impacts demand. The model further established predictions with regards to 
signal strength and the magnitude and duration of the impact. The final two chapters 
present case studies that empirically tested these predictions. Specifically, the fourth 
chapter estimated the impact of leafy green recall events on the demand for packaged 
leafy green products. The results of several binary response model estimations suggest 
that iceberg and romaine recall events negatively impacted demand for the implicated 
leafy green in the weeks immediately following the recall. The fifth chapter estimated the 
impact of STEC-contaminated ground beef recall events on the demand for ground beef 
products, differentiating between recalls prompted by consumer illness investigations and 
those prompted by laboratory testing. The results suggest that the impacts of recalls 
prompted by consumer illnesses outbreaks are often greater and last longer than the 
impacts of recalls prompted by pathogen testing. 
 While the research presented here sheds considerable light on the trends and 
demand impacts of food product recalls, it is clear that considerable work remains. For 
one, there is clear need for work exploring the benefits, costs, and impacts of allergen 
labeling. As illustrated in the first chapter, there has been a significant increase in the 
prevalence of reported food allergies and the number of recalls due to undeclared 
allergens, yet very little is known about the economic consequences. Second, with 
regards to consumer demand and food product recalls, there exists little empirical work 
that differentiates between the impact of commodity-wide demand and brand-specific 
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demand. This distinction is of particular importance because economic theory regarding 
traceability, liability, and collective reputation posits that consumers may respond to 
brand-specific recalls by avoiding implicated brands rather than the commodity as a 
whole if they believe the health risk to be specific to the firm and not the whole 
commodity. Lastly, on the supply side, there exists very little knowledge regarding the 
impact of food product recalls on producer behavior and incentives to adopt safe 
production practices. In this regard, the dataset of FDA and FSIS recalls developed for 




Appendix A. Food Product Recall Categorization 
Food Categories   
Grains  Other or Mixed Vegetables 




Rice and Pasta  Frozen 
Breakfast Cereal  Prepared 
Flour, Bread Mixes, Dough  Dried 
Snacks  Sprouts 
Cake and Baking Mixes  Fresh Herbs 
Baked Goods (incl. Packaged)  Vegetable Juices 
Fungi  Fruit 
Fresh  Fresh 
Canned  Frozen 
Prepared  Canned/Bottled  
Dried  Dried 
Leafy Vegetables  Fruit Juices 
Fresh  Dairy 
Frozen  Milk 
Canned  Cream 
Prepared  Yogurt 
Dried  Cheese 
Root Vegetables  Processed Cheese Products and Sauces 
Fresh 
 Dairy Desserts (e.g. Ice Cream, Pudding, 
etc.) 
Frozen  Beef 
Canned  Fresh 
Prepared  Frozen 
Dried  Cooked (Refrigerated/Frozen) 
Vine-Stalk Vegetables  Pork 
Fresh  Fresh 
Frozen  Frozen 
Canned  Cooked (Refrigerated/Frozen) 
Prepared  Game/Lamb/Other Meat 
Dried  Fresh 
Beans, Lentils, Peas, and Legumes  Frozen 
Fresh/Dried  Poultry 
Frozen  Fresh 
Canned  Frozen 
Prepared  Canned 
  Cooked (Frozen/Refrigerated) 
100 
 
Appendix A. Food Product Recall Categorization (cont.) 
Food Categories   
Bacon, Sausage, and Lunch Meats  Other Foods 
Fish  Fats and Oils 
Fresh  Salad Dressing 
Frozen  Gravies, Sauces, Condiments 
Canned or Packaged  Spices/Seasonings 
Dried  Nutrition Bars 
Smoked  Baby Formula and Food 
Crustaceans  Sweets 
Fresh  Sweeteners 
Frozen  Jellies/Jams/Preserved Fruit 
Canned or Packaged  Candy 
Mollusks  Soups 
Fresh  Soups, Ready-to-Serve, Condensed, Bases 
Frozen  Soups, Dry 
Canned or Packaged  Prepared Meals 
Nuts and Seeds  Ready-to-Eat 
Nuts, Seeds, and Nut Mixes  Ready-to-Eat Sandwiches 
Processed Nuts and Seeds (e.g., Nut Butters)  Ready-to-Eat Salads with Greens 
Eggs and Egg Mixtures  Frozen or Refrigerated (Ready-to-Heat) 
Tofu and Meat Substitutes  Canned or Packaged (Shelf Stable) 
Beverages   
Coffee   
Tea   
Carbonated   
Non-Carbonated   
Alcohol   
Water   





Appendix B. Estimated Fixed Effects LPM Coefficients for Leafy Green Demand 
with Publicized (P) and Non-Publicized (NP) Recall Events 
 Romaine Iceberg Spinach 






































































Household Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Households 94,763 94,763 94,763 
Observations 3,304,065 3,304,065 3,304,065 
R-squared 0.3159 0.3063 0.2823 
Notes: Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five and one percent level, 
respectively.   
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Appendix C. Estimated Coefficients for Combined Leafy Green Demand 
 LPM OLS LPM FE RE Probit FE Logit 



























































































































































Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Households 94,763 94,763 94,763 88,257 
Observations 3,305,078 3,305,078 3,305,078 3,140,694 
R-squared 0.0110 0.2953 -- -- 
Log Likelihood -- -- -1,630,067 -1,331,339 
Notes: Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five and one percent level, 
respectively. Household income and size variables are relative to the median household of two persons and 
an income of $50,000-$59,999.   
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Appendix D. Estimated Coefficients for Leafy Green Demand 
 Romaine Iceberg 





























































































































































































































































































































































Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Households 94,763 94,763 94,763 57,946 94,763 94,763 94,763 63,948 
Observations 3,304,065 3,304,065 3,304,065 2,176,205 3,304,065 3,304,065 3,304,065 2,388,717 
R-squared 0.0101 0.3159 -- -- 0.0071 0.3063 -- -- 
Log Likelihood --  -- -898,482 -684,075 -- -- -1,015,083 -783,464 
Note:Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. Household 
income and size variables are relative to the median household of two persons and median income of $50,000-$59,999.  
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Appendix D. Estimated Coefficients for Leafy Green Demand (cont.) 
 Spinach 
































































































































































































Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Households 94,763 94,763 94,763 46,042 
Observations 3,304,065 3,304,065 3,304,065 1,756,578 
R-squared 0.0077 0.2823 -- -- 
Log Likelihood -- -- -673,424 -497,108 
Note:Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. Household 
income and size variables are relative to the median household of two persons and median income of $50,000-$59,999. 
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Appendix E. Estimated Coefficients for Ground Beef Demand 
 LPM OLS LPM FE RE Probit FE Logit 




































































































































































Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Households 67,446 67,446 67,446 67,174 
Observations 2,446,036 2,446,036 2,446,036 2,440,807 
R-squared 0.0163 0.2418 -- -- 
Log Likelihood -- -- -985,861 -793,279 
Notes: Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) indicate significance at the five and one percent level, 
respectively. Household income and size variables are relative to the median household of two persons and 
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